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This study is a case study on the different European associations’ advocacy efforts towards 
the Commission during the agenda-setting stage of the recently adopted Energy Efficiency 
Directive. In order to understand what facilitates interest groups access to the Commission, a 
model of demand and supply for information is presented. This model takes the theory of 
access goods as the point of departure, complimented with recent studies on interest groups 
supply of information to European institutions. Here, information supply is understood in 
terms of an interest group capacity to gather information through monitoring policy 
developments and producing relevant policy information. The study finds out that the 
Commission was largely in need of technical information and that groups from the building 
sector were the major providers of such information. Also, since many of the interest groups 
lobby strategies was recognized by a high degree of coalition building, the study seeks to 
explain under what conditions coalition building between European federations can occur at 
the EU level. This refers to a specific case of coalition building, namely the Coalition for 
Energy Savings. This coalition will be attempted explained through the use of process tracing 
by drawing on earlier literature and empirical evidence of collaboration between interest 
groups. The study thus takes an exploratory and theory development approach. To that end, 
interviews were conducted with representatives from leading European federations, including 
coalition staff. Finally, findings indicate that both interest groups previous collaborative 
behavior as well as the nature of the policy issue explains why interest groups decide to 
establish a coalition.   
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It has gone over 70 years since Harold Lasswell (1950) [1936] famously wrote that politics is 
about “who gets what, when and how”. As this quote indicates, politics is about distribution 
and redistribution of goods. This coincides with the classical definition of political science as 
the study of the authoritative allocation of resources. In democracies, interest groups play a 
central role in terms of resource allocation and connecting citizens’ preferences with decision 
makers. Since all modern societies are constructed around interest cleavages, interest groups 
become compelling research subjects. Grasping how such cleavages are mediated at the EU 
level is widely acknowledged to be central when assessing its democratic performance. 
Moreover, EU-interest groups relations can yield insights into comparative public policy, 
political economy, in addition European integration and interest groups role therein 
(Greenwood 2011: 5). Following the establishment of the European single market from the 
treaty of Maastricht, there has been an increased interest group activity to influence 
concomitant legislation. The numbers of interest groups and lobbyists estimated to be in 
Brussels varies substantially, whereas latest numbers consider the number of organizations 
active at the EU level to be around 3700 (Wonka et.al. 2010). However, this is not clearly 
distinguished from other types of organizations, but the majority of these are European 
associations consisting of firms, national associations and firms, NGOs (Non Governmental 
Organizations) or public groups (Greenwood 2011: 10 - 12). They are referred to as Euro-
federations. Recent sources indicates that as much as three fifths of all these associations are 
pure federations (member base being only national associations), around a quarter consists of 
both national associations and firms, and one quarter enfold exclusively companies 
(Greenwood 2011: 71). Their main function is to aggregate a common interest position among 
their members and to communicate their policy messages to the different EU institutions. 
Also, Euro-federations might work in alignment to achieve common goals; either as a part of 
a network or through developing a formal coalition. This aspect has been paid comparatively 
less attention to in Europe, than for instance in the US (see Warleigh 2000, Mahoney 2007a 
and 2008 for exceptions). This is a study on the different advocacy activities Euro-federations 
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and their intra-group position building before the European Commission (hereafter 
Commission) proposal towards the Energy Efficiency Directive (EED).  
 
It is well known that the cheapest energy and cleanest energy is the energy not consumed. 
Although energy efficiency relatively old policy domain in climate and energy politics, there 
has been limited legislative action for energy efficiency in terms of strength at the EU level 
(Hennigsen 2011), until recently. Energy efficiency contributes to EUs main overall goals 
which are to combat climate gas mitigation, strengthening the security of energy supply as 
well as creating jobs and economic growth (Commission 2011a; Commission 2011c). Energy 
Efficiency has also been recognized as the most cost-effective policy area for reducing CO2-
emissions, in addition to be economically beneficial for end-users through to smaller energy 
bills (Hennigsen 2011: 131). It is noteworthy that in spite of these long-term benefits attached 
to energy efficiency, the final policy outcome of the directive is rather modest in terms of the 
total energy savings amount. In Europe today, buildings account for approximately 40 percent 
of the total energy use and 36 percent of the total of EUs CO2-emissions (Commission 2008c: 
8). However, realizing this unexploited potential for increased energy savings has been 
proved difficult. The main obstacles to attain energy savings largely stems from the high up-
front costs and the limited financial sources to building renovation. Energy efficiency is that 
only part EUs climate and energy package that will most likely not meet the stated target of 
20 percent energy consumption reduction. Instead, the Directive introduces binding policy 
instruments. The main requirements of the EED is that member states have to achieve energy 
end-use savings of 1.5 percent each year by the energy suppliers or distributors operating on 
the member states territory, calculated after the expected 2020 level of consumption 
(Commission 2012). This policy instrument is a so called Energy Efficiency Obligations 
(EEO) arrangement. However, energy suppliers can themselves decide where to implement 
measures to attain energy savings. Through the EEO policy instrument, energy suppliers and 
distributors have become responsible for a 1.5 percent annual reduction of their consumers 
total energy end-use. Another central feature of EED is to increase the renovation rate of 
buildings by the national governments: the EED prescribes a 3 percent renovation rate 
annually for public buildings, owned or occupied by the central government, as well as 
ordering member states to draw up national strategies for long term renovation of the rest of 
the building stock (Commission 2012). The study is primarily concerned with how leading 
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European associations approached the policy design of the Directive, both with regard to 
binding energy efficiency targets and policy instruments to attain the targets as such.  
1.2 Research Questions 
This study is a case study on the European associations lobbying efforts and interaction 
towards the Commission during the pre-legislative stage of the EED. Seeking access to the 
Commission directly is only one of the many venues which interest groups can pursue, where 
the European Parliament (EP), the Council, national governments and even the European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) can also be targeted for interest groups advocacy efforts (Ydersbond 
2011: 11 – 12). However, there are good arguments to focus on the Commission as a single 
access point with regard to the EED. The pre-legislative period of a proposal is widely 
conceived to be the most fertile stage for interest groups to influence legislation (Crombez 
2002; Eising 2007a; Bouwen 2009: 22). Being responsible for regulating a single market 
consisting of almost 500 million people and 27 national regulatory systems, the Commission 
is a small bureaucracy that often lacks full information about the problem it has to solve (Hix 
and Høyland: 2011: 182). Serving as a political neutral body and having mainly a technocratic 
function, the Commission usually requires a lot of technical information to accomplish its 
tasks (Bouwen 2002; 2004; 2009; Chalmers 2013a: 41). Interest groups that want to influence 
legislation early would thus do well in meeting the Commission demands for expert 
information early. Studying lobbyism as a transaction of information has been firmly 
acknowledged in earlier research (Austen-Smith 1993; Bouwen 2002; 2004; 2009; Klüver 
2013; Chalmers 2011; 2013a: 40). The Commission has also been identified as the central 
target for interest groups lobbying (Gullberg 2008b; Chalmers 2013b: 3). Business groups do 
also more often lobby the Commission, than the EP, because this is perceived to be more cost-
efficient to achieve their aims (Gullberg 2008a). Studies also show that interest groups have 
more contact in general with the Commission, than other EU institutions (Eising 2009: 140 – 
41), and that interest groups are especially more prone to lobby the bureaucracy when policy 
content is rather technical (Binderkrantz and Krøyer 2012). The Commission also has a 
tendency to cooperate with European associations by granting them a higher degree of access, 
than for instance firms (Bouwen (2004: 356). Moreover, recent research suggests that the 
Commission has increasingly acquired the role and competencies of a more supranational 




The study will propose a model to explain the demand and supply of information between the 
Commission and interest groups, with the starting point of Bouwen`s theory of “access 
goods”. This theory asserts that interest groups access to policy-makers in the EU, are mainly 
driven by the European institutions informational need (Bouwen 2002; 2004; 2009). This 
framework will be complemented with theory and evidence from recent research that 
investigates how interest groups are able to meet these informational demands (Chalmers 
2011; 2013a). The ability to supply information by interest groups is mainly understood by 
Chalmers (2011) as the interest groups capacity for gathering information. This information 
gathering includes their abilities to monitor and anticipate policy developments, as well as 
their strategies to produce policy relevant research information. Interest groups can also 
choose to transmit this information through different mediums (Chalmers 2011; 2013a). Put 
together, the demand and supply for information between decision makers and lobbyists can 
be seen as model for resource exchange. Interest groups can also work in alignment with other 
actors to supply what the Commission demands. The study therefore further aims to 
investigate how interest groups coordinated themselves and how they aggregated a joint 
advocacy position between them. This was a prominent feature of the pre-proposal stage for 
some groups, since many informants reported that a significant part of their advocacy efforts 
went to establishing a formal coalition. At the EU level, coalition building is thought to occur 
less seldom than for instance in the US (Mahoney 2007a: 2008). The study will therefore 
draw on earlier theory and empirical evidence of coalition building between interest groups 
from the American context in order to explore the determinants behind interest groups 
decision to form a coalition. The research question for this study is thus two-tiered. The first 
question targets the overall access of interest groups to Commission, from desk officers to the 
Cabinet. The purpose of the second question refers to the specific case of developing and 
aggregating the Coalition for Energy Savings, which is a case of coalition building between 
various European associations. The motivation behind the latter question is to explore under 
which circumstances European associations engages in formal coalition building.  
1. What kind of “access goods” did the European associations supply to the Commission 
before the EED proposal, and what strategies did they employ to do so? 
2. Why did some of the Euro-federations establish a coalition to promote energy 
efficiency, and how did they aggregate a joint advocacy position among them?  
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1.3 The Role of European Federations in the EU 
Ernst Haas (1958) described in one of the earliest accounts for European integration how civil 
loyalties could transfer through organizations from the national to the European level, up to 
the point till they become agents of integration themselves. This still seems some way off. 
However, one does not need admit the fact that civil loyalty has not changed to the 
supranational level, to concede that Brussels has become the center of gravity for European 
interest groups (Richardson 2000; Hix and Høyland 2011). The drive towards the single 
market and concomitant transfer of competencies, have made business interests frontrunners 
of EU integration in order to influence legislation (Hix and Høyland 2011: 165; Greenwood 
2011: 65). This is natural as firms, which often look to their Euro-federation for political 
representation, carries the cost and benefits of EU regulation (Majone 1996). Today, the civil 
society in Brussels is more developed than in any of the other European capitals in terms of 
number of actors (Hix and Høyland 2011: 165). Euro-federations are only sub-species of the 
whole EU interest group population (Eising 2009: 18), but because they aggregate a joint 
position among their members, they tend be considered as authoritative by the Commission 
(Bouwen 2002: 2004; Greenwood 2011). As such, they are what Knill (2001) calls “interface 
actors”, since they face both inwards towards their members and outwards on the European 
level to represent their interest constituency. This makes them especially well suited to 
mediate internally between interests across different institutional levels and related sectors 
(Knill 2001: 237 – 238).  
 
For their members, the European federations` main functions are to gather information about 
EU policy developments, liaise between and represent their members, as well as develop 
common positions and open up linkages to the EU-institutions (Eising 2009: 65 – 67). They 
therefore tend to have greater access to policy makers, because they can reduce the transaction 
cost for the officials need to acquire information. This organizational mode is widely 
perceived to be effective by all involved parties (Greenwood and Cram 1996: 453; Van 
Schendelen 2005: 129). Although the Euro-federation model has earlier been criticized for its 
shortcomings such as diffuse member bases, scarce resources and slow internal decision-
making (McLaughlin and Jordan 1993), they have over time become more specialized actors 
with increasing capacity to provide information to policy makers (Greenwood 2011). The 
organizational autonomy of the Euro-federation is somewhat more debated; to what extent 
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they are actors in their own right instead of an instrument or a forum for their members 
(Eising 2009: 66, 184). Knill (2001) points out that some Euro-federations have received too 
little credit for their importance as policy brokers. Also, they have over time developed a 
considerable autonomy in devising strategies for their members (Greenwood 2011).  
1.4 EUs Climate and Energy Policy  
EUs energy and climate policy went from being in a state of “relative neglect”, to a sudden 
rise of legislative acts and proposals in the mid-2000s (Duffield and Birchfield 2011: 5). The 
advancement of creating a single energy market had for a long time been on the agenda, but 
new measures in the field renewable energy, emissions trading and energy efficiency was also 
put forth. The goals for each of these sectors became integrated in an “energy and climate” 
package which was presented by the Commission in 2008 (Duffield and Birchfield 2011: 5 – 
6), and formally adopted by the Council on year later. A preceding green paper and action 
plan had set forth the targets, namely to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emission by 20 
percent, achieve 20 percent of energy consumption from renewable sources by 20 percent, 
and reduce energy consumption by 20 percent, all to be attained by the year 2020 
(Commission 2008a; Duffield and Birchfield 2011: 5). These are frequently referred to as the 
“20-20-20” targets. Although recognized of being of equal importance as the other policy 
areas in the climate and energy package (Hennigsen 2011), energy efficiency is the last 
domain to be addressed through independent legislation. To improve the state of energy 
efficiency, an Energy Efficiency action plan was launched with a subsequent Energy 
Efficiency Directive, which was proposed in June 2011 and finally passed in October 2012. 
Two preceding directives for energy efficiency (2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC) are subsequently 
repelled. Apart from being one of the most cost-effective ways to reduce the emissions of 
GHG-emissions (Hennigsen 2011), energy efficiency is central to curb the increasing energy 
demand in Europe (Commission 2008b; IEA: 2010; Commission 2011a). Figure 1 shows that 
the EU was not on track to meet this target; without the EED, EU would achieve only 10 
percent of the 20 percent target. With measures introduces from the EED, it is expected that 
the European community can reduce its energy consumption by 15 percent in 2020, when the 
transport sector is omitted (Commission 2012)
1
. The energy efficiency domain is thus most 
                                                 
1
 Energy sales for transport purposes is excluded from the directive, is this constitute an independent policy area. 
Regulations of the transport sector could be expected to reduce energy consumption by around two percent 
(Commission 2011a).   
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likely the single part of EUs climate and energy package which will not meet the adopted 
target. 
 
Figure 1: EUs expected achievement of the “20-20-20” targets, before the adoption of EED.  
Source: Commission 2011e 
1.5 EUs Energy Efficiency Policy: New Solutions to 
an Older Problem?  
“A critical first step in the design of effective policies for improving electricity end-use efficiency is examining 
the regulatory framework for and participation of electric utilities. (...) Electricity utilities might play an 
important role in implementing a number of such programmes (...). (…) it is essential that governments and 
utilities work co-operatively in designing and implementing effective policies to improve end-use efficiency. 
Many of the actions that might be considered desirable by governments are best implemented by utilities. But if 
the utilities view the policy as conflicting with their own business objectives, effective implementation may be 
hampered.”  
        (IEA 1989: 125f, quoted from Steuwer 2013: 2) 
 
 
The principal part of the EED is the introduction of binding measures rather than binding 
targets. The most important policy measure which is set forth is energy-end use savings 
targets through the policy instrument referred to as Energy Efficiency Obligations. As the 
quote illustrates, the International Energy Agency (IEA) has for a long time identified one of 
the main to challenges to improve energy efficient end-use, namely how to include the electric 
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utilities. Despite the apparent benefits to energy efficiency such as reduced GHG emissions as 
well as being financially beneficial (since upgrades would eventually pay for themselves 
through reduced energy expenditures), the overall political integration in the field of energy 
efficiency has been low. The newly introduced EEO instrument could offer some remedy to 
this, by making energy suppliers and transmitters responsible for energy savings in the end-
use sector across the EU. Henningsen (2011) points out that the EU, as well as the IEA, has 
been consistent in identifying the necessary prescriptions to reduce energy consumption, 
while not delivering the needed instruments. The EED proposal introduced two main 
measures to improve this state, namely by suggesting new policy instrument in making a 
Energy Supplier Obligations scheme mandatory for all EU member states, in addition to an 
three percent annual renovation of public buildings. In order to increase Europe’s 
performance in energy efficiency, measures would have to be directed towards the sector in 
which the greatest potential for energy savings lies, which are in buildings (Commission 
2011c: 11). In Europe, buildings accounts for approximately 40 percent of Europe’s total 
energy end-use, whereas heating and lightning counts for most of the energy consumption in 
buildings (Commission 2011a; 2011c). Today, most of the energy efficiency investments are 
directed towards new buildings rather than old building refurbishments, although existing 
buildings make up the largest share of the worlds energy end-use (IEA 2010; Economist 
Intelligence Unit 2012: 3). Since energy consumption spans almost all sectors of society, 
measures to improve savings have multiple implementation possibilities (such as for instance 
industry or transportation). But in order to attain the largest amount of energy savings, the 
renovation process of private and public buildings and how to improve the energy 
performance of appliances are crucial, as it is the residential sector where the greatest energy 
savings potential is (Commission 2011a: 3).  
 
A weakness is in the EEO instrument as adopted, is that the policy design of these are not 
prescribed after the year 2020 in the EED. Although there are no concrete steps in the EED 
for this policy design beyond the year 2020, the Directive specify in article 1.1 that the 
framework is established in order to “pave the way for further energy efficiency 
improvements beyond that date” (Commission 2012: 10). It is possible that a revision will 
further build on the introduced instruments. A strengthening of the EEO framework could 
potentially introduce policy instruments that exist in some of the EU member countries, such 
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as Tradable White Certificate scheme (TWCs), where trading of energy savings are permitted. 
Such policy designs are more thoroughly explained in chapter two.  
 
To reach the target EU has set itself, energy consumption must in absolute terms be reduced 
by 368 Million tons of oil equivalent (Mtoe), after the adopted 20 percent target from 2007 
(EED guidebook 2013a). This is calculated after the projected energy consumption in 2020, 
which is 1842 Mtoe. In the Directive, the 20 percent target is identified to be 1474 Mtoe in 
absolute terms (Commission 2012: 12). As seen in figure 2, the EU will most likely fail to 
meet the target of 20 percent reduction with 190 Mtoe. To make up for this gap, the 
Commission has proposed a two-step approach, where member states in the first phase 
determines national energy efficiency targets and programmes. If these are not sufficient to 
reach the 20 percent target, the Commission will most likely further suggests further measures 
after the evaluation of the Directive is due in 2016 (Commission 2012: 26 - 27). 
 




The responsibility to initiate legislative proposals in the EU grants the Commission an agenda 
setting status (Bouwen 2002). When policy is being formulated, it is mostly rational for 
interest groups to target the agenda-setter (Crombez 2002). The agenda-setting phase is 
generally conceived to be the most fertile phase to exert influence since changes in the policy 
content can be made more easily (Crombez 2002; Eising 2007a; Bouwen 2009: 22). To 
understand how interest groups influenced the Commission on the EED proposal, a model of 
demand and supply for resources is put forth. This model takes the point of departure as 
Bouwen`s framework of access goods (Bouwen 2002). Access goods are those goods the EU 
institutions wants back from giving access to non-state actors (Bouwen 2002: 369), which is 
considered to be information (Bouwen 2002; 2004; 2009; Beyers 2004; Chalmers 2011; 
2013a; Gullberg 2011). Theories according to demand side factors such as what kind of 
information the Commission needs will be presented (Bouwen 2002) and complimented with 
theory and evidence about interest groups strategies for information supply (Chalmers 2011; 
2013a). These supply side factors take into account which extent the interest groups possess 
the actual capacity to meet the informational demands by the Commission (Chalmers 2013a). 
The interest groups ability to gather information consists of their capacity to monitor policy 
developments through different sources, while the interest groups research strategies concerns 
how they produce relevant policy information (Chalmers 2011: 472). This also includes the 
strategies of interest groups for supplying their produced information to decision makers.  
 
In order to answer research question two on how interest groups established a coalition, 
earlier research mainly from the context of US politics will be presented and elaborated. 
Research on interest groups coalitional behavior at the EU stage has been comparatively less 
examined than in the US. This might be because interest groups in the EU are believed to 
form issue specific coalitions less often than their American counterparts (Mahoney 2008: 
172). The study will therefore draw on theory and evidence from US context to explain 
coalition building, combined with insights from previous studies of interest groups coalition 
behavior at the EU level. The American body of literature emphasize under which conditions 
interest groups decide to work in alignment with others and adopt a joint position (Hojnacki 
1997; Hula 1999; Mahoney 2008). There are two main contributing factors to coalition 
building, namely the characteristics of the involved interest groups, and characteristics 
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pertaining to the specific nature of the policy area. In order to understand when and why 
coalitions between interest groups develop, factors such as previous experience with 
cooperation and the issue context which they face will be scrutinized. The factors related to 
the issue context such as narrow interest constituencies, shared competencies between groups 
and the relative opposition they face are central explanations. Also what factors that can 
facilitate intra-group cohesion inside a formal coalition will be given attention. The decision 
by interest groups to collaborate formally will also be examined in the context of the energy 
efficiency policies at the EU level.  
1.7 Research Design 
Measuring influence is acknowledged to be one of the most challenging concepts to define in 
political science (Chalmers 2011: 471). Dür (2008a: 561) understands influence as the ability 
of an actor “to shape a decision in line with her preferences”. Applied to the EU level, there 
are many caveats to attempting measuring influence, such as the presence of different 
channels of influence and the different stages influence can be wielded in (Dür 2008a: 561). 
Studying access is generally thought to be a precondition for influence (Bouwen 2002; 
Gullberg 2011: 474). This study is preoccupied with the lobby efforts of Euro-federations 
during the pre-legislative phase of the EED. It therefore only looks at the interest groups 
access to the Commission as an indicator for interest groups influence. However, it is possible 
for interest groups to have a high degree of access to policy-makers and still be ineffective in 
translating it into influence on policy output (Bouwen 2002; Dür and de Bièvre 2007a). But 
overall, having access to decision makers implies a better position to influence policy makers, 
compared to those who don’t have access. Lobbyism can broadly be defined as “interest 
groups contact with – and activities directed at – decision makers in attempt to influence 
public policy” (Gullberg 2008a: 2965). Since this study is concerned with the demand and 
supply of informational between the Commission and interest groups, the study is limited in 
scope by looking at formal channels of influence, such as seeking access to policy makers 
through formal channels
2
 (Bouwen and McCown 2007). Other channels of influence through 
                                                 
2
Bouwen and McCown (2007) also suggest legal litigation as an independent lobby strategy. In this case it is 




non-institutionalized participation such as informal meetings with decision-makers (Gullberg 
2008a: 2965), is not of main consideration.  
 
As a rather understudied domain within EUs climate and energy policy, there is little 
information available on energy efficiency. The study therefore aims to cover the change of 
interest groups constellations during the build-up process of the EED by process tracing. This 
is necessary to cover the chain of events leading up to the establishment of the Coalition for 
Energy Savings. This is relevant as some interest groups and environmental NGOs were 
active in building position with other actors to advance the status of energy efficiency and the 
status of 20 percent binding targets in particular, in order to shape the Commission’s proposal. 
Since coalition formation occurs rather infrequently at the EU level than in the US (Mahoney 
2007a; 2008), the study will take a theory development approach in order to examine the 
conditions for coalition building among Euro-federations. The aim is to identify which factors 
that has to be present for a coalition to form and when coalition building between Euro-
federations is likely occur. This explorative approach is however grounded in former theory 
and empirical evidence from the US context (Hojnacki 1997; Hula 1999), as well as insights 
from coalition formation at the EU level (Pijneburg 1998; Warleigh 2000).  
 
Since energy efficiency is an encompassing sector in terms of the potential involved parties, a 
strategic selection of interest groups was necessary. Attaining a perfect sample of all affected 
parties by the legislation would be very difficult within the limited scope of the assignment. 
Informants from the most important sectors such as energy producers, building and 
construction industry, enterprise and environmental Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs) were approached in order to create a representative and balanced sample of 
stakeholders. In order to answer the question of coalition building, four the interviewed 
interest groups were also founding members of the Coalition for Energy Savings, as well as 
interviews was conducted with a former and a present coalition employee. Since talking to all 
the members about their coalition building activities would hardly be feasible within the given 
scope of time, these were key informants. Data was collected through interviews with 
representatives from leading European associations and from other sources such as research 




Interest groups can be defined as “all societal actors who have a political interest, who are 
organized, and do not strive for public office” (Beyers, Eising and Maloney 2008: 106-107). 
This definition does not exclude other actors engaged in advocacy efforts, such as think-tanks, 
research institutes and consultancies. In this study, only Euro-federations were approached for 
interview, besides those who were active as staff inside the Coalition for Energy Savings. 
Companies were not approached due to the established preference of the Commission to work 
Euro-federations early in the legislative procedure (Bouwen 2004). Research institutes and 
think-tanks were not approached in order to preserve the sample for stakeholders who have a 
clear adopted preference in the legislation. Since the study is preoccupied with the pre-
legislative phase of the EED, other venues for interest groups at the EU level such as the EP 
and the Council are not of primary concern. Since energy efficiency has been overlooked in 
comparison with the other parts of the climate and energy package (Hennigsen 2011), it is 
important to study those groups who where central agenda setters during the pre-legislative 
process of the EED. It is therefore reasonable to focus on the supranational stage when a 
relatively new policy area is formulated in an encompassing manner. Also, looking at interest 
groups from various member countries during the pre-legislative of the EED phase is also 
hardly feasible as there are very few nationally specialized interest associations for energy 
efficiency in Europe today. For instance, Germany has only one interest group specialized in 
the promotion of energy efficiency services
3
 versus the twenty-five associations engaged in 
renewable energy production
4
. The study does also not consider the lobbying activities from 
different Euro-federations or their members’ advocacy towards the member states, as it is not 
feasible within the given scope of time. Such an analytical potential is also exacerbated by the 
fact that very few interest groups within the energy efficiency domain are sufficiently 
bestowed to lobby many channels at the same time. This is especially relevant for the building 
sector, as representatives from the sector did indeed confirm that their sector was struggling 
financially in many countries.  
 
                                                 
3
 Germanys only specialized interest groups for the promotion of energy efficiency is “Deutsche 
Unternehmensinitiative Energieeffizienz e.V.“ (DENEFF), established in 2011. To my knowledge, there are no 
other interest groups specialized in energy efficiency present in other EU countries today.  
4
The number twenty-five is counted as the number of members in the national umbrella organization for 




Since energy use spans nearly all sectors of society, energy efficiency is a complex policy 
area (Hennigsen 2011). This implies that it is necessary to narrow down the selection of 
policy instruments from the EED which is included within the scope of the study. The study 
therefore only considers interest groups lobby efforts about 1) binding energy targets, 2) 
energy efficiency obligations, 3) public building refurbishment and 4) long-term roadmaps for 
building renovation, which were the parts of highest salience to most of the interest groups in 
the EED.  
1.9 Outline of the Thesis 
In chapter two, the complexity of regulation the energy efficiency sector is further explained. 
Chapter three presents the theoretical framework for demand and supply towards the 
Commission, as well as earlier theories and empirical evidence on interest groups` coalition 
building. Chapter four outlines the method of the study. Chapter five presents the findings of 
the study, where the general findings of information demand and supply is presented. 
Thereafter the advocacy activity of every interest group in the study towards the EED is 
outlined. Then the process behind forming the Coalition for Energy Savings is traced with 
explanations provided from earlier theory and empirical evidence is outlined together with a 
further discussion the conditions coalitions form. Chapter six summarizes the findings from 
the study with some tentative conclusions under which circumstances coalition can be 




This chapter will briefly present the context for energy efficiency in the EUs climate and 
energy policy, as well as nationally existing energy efficiency policy schemes and 
instruments. Then the regulatory problems facing increased governance of the energy 
efficiency sector is discussed, as well as a more in-depth presentation of the policy 
instruments proposed in the EED.  
2.1 The Role of Energy Efficiency in EUs Climate 
and Energy Policy 
In the EU today, the single greatest potential for energy savings lies in the current building 
stock (Commission 2011c: 11). Increased investments in energy efficiency and savings are 
crucial to meet EU long-term climate and energy goals, such as reducing GHG emission by 
80 – 95 percent in 2050 compared to 1990 levels5 (Commission 2010; Commission 2011b; 
Commission 2011c: 11). Following from the Directive for energy efficiency end-use (ESD) in 
2006, member states were obliged to introduce National Energy Efficient Action Plans 
(NEEAPs) and report on their efforts in improving energy efficiency to the Commission and 
establish national indicative energy efficiency targets (Commission 2009; (Hennigsen 2011: 
135 – 36). The ESD also commits energy companies to promote energy efficiency among the 
customers in the end-use sector, although these obligations has been criticized for containing 
little concrete and too few mandatory measures (Hennigsen 2011: 135). The NEEAPs 
introduced largely reflect national policy prioritizations across member countries 
(Commission 2009). In a later assessment by the Commission, member states were subject to 
open critic for being too unambitious and not doing enough in order to achieve the adopted 20 
percent energy efficiency target: “The quality of National Energy Efficiency Action Plans, 
developed by Member States since  2008, is disappointing, leaving vast potential untapped” 
(Commission 2010: 3). Earlier policy measures within the energy efficiency field also include 
addressing new buildings such as the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) and 
                                                 
5Improving energy efficiency can broadly be defined as delivering “more services for the same energy input, or 
the same services for less energy input” (IEA 2013). This entails that the improvement is caused from 
technological improvement and not through the change of fuels (IEA 2012: 271). This is distinct from the 
concept of energy savings, which refers to: “an amount of saved energy determined by measuring and/or 
estimating consumption before and after implementation of an energy efficiency improvement” (Commission 
2012: 10).  
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the Eco-design Directive (see figure 3). The EPBD prescribes the energy efficiency measures 
in new buildings, with the aim to make them almost nearly zero-emitters by 2020, but has 
been let down by the majority of member states through lack of compliance (Euractiv 2013a). 
The Eco-design Directive targets mainly the energy product labeling of appliances. As the last 
independent policy area of EUs climate and energy package, the energy efficiency domain is 
also the exception in not having adopted a clear long-term market-based mechanism. Both the 
Renewable directive and the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) emphasize market 
based instruments as policy instruments to achieve the stated goals by establishing tradability 
among set quotas (Toke 2008; Wettestad 2010). The motivation behind pursuing market-
based instruments in energy and climate policy is because of their potential to correct market 
failures cost-efficiently (Commission 2007: 3), although they can often face problems when 
introduced in practice (Tingaard Svendsen 1999: 109).  
 
With the successive opening of the electricity and gas markets in the EU to free competition, 
compatible policy instruments in order to promote energy efficiency in the end-use sector will 
eventually have to be advanced (Bertoldi and Huld 2006: 215). Policy instruments to regulate 
energy efficiency in end-use have often been referred to as energy supplier obligations or 
white certificates (Bertoldi et.al.2010; Steuwer 2013). The Commission has earlier expressed 
interest in adopting a so called Tradable White Certificates scheme (TWCs)
6
. A foregoing 
green paper on energy efficiency stated that the Commission was considering preparing for a 
possible solution for an EU wide Tradable White Certificate scheme, which would allow trade 
of saved energy schemes among member states, as a possible policy instrument to realize the 
scenario of reducing energy consumption by 20 percent (Commission 2005). The foregoing 
energy end-use efficiency and service directive also emphasized this approach (Commission 
2006: 69): “(…) the commission shall examine whether it is appropriate to come forward with 
a proposal for a Directive to develop the market approach in energy efficiency improvement 
by means of white certificates”. However, this idea of introducing white certificate schemes 
was dropped in the EED proposal by the Commission, since it would create larger 
administrative burdens (Commission 2011c: 11). A white certificate scheme entails 
                                                 
6
 As an instrument to regulate energy end-use, EEOs meets the classification of a so-called baseline-and-credit 
scheme, while the ETS is a cap-and-trade scheme (Steuwer 2013: 29 – 35). So called cap-and-trade schemes 
determines an overall emission cap, implying that only a given number of emissions are permitted (Steuwer 
2013: 35). For every unit of emission, the emitter has a permit that might be sold to other actors. Within energy 
efficiency, TWCs refer to trade with certified energy savings. Such policy design is described in section 2.2.  
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establishing certificates to which a certain amount of savings belongs, and that can be traded 
as a commodity (Bertoldi et.al 2010: 1461 – 63). Schemes with tradable certificates costs 
more to administer as a public bodies that can certify and monitor the trade would be needed 
established, although this could be regarded as a one-off installation cost to facilitate the 
trading on an operational market (Commission 2011d: 34). However, trading is not needed 
per se to enable energy savings. Subordinating energy efficiency measures to the ETS-
umbrella has also earlier been discussed, but such an arrangement face problems in how to 
quantify the different emission savings separately (Bertoldi and Huld 2006: 215).  
 
As seen in figure 3, the EU has until the adoption of EED had more of a patchwork approach 
to its energy efficiency policy. The different measures for energy efficiency relates to 
different stages in the energy chain where savings can be gained and counted: energy 
production, transformation, distribution and final consumption (Commission 2010: 6). 
Whereas Combine Heating and Power (CHP) concern the generation and transformation of 
power, The Energy Service Directive regulates energy consumption in the end-use sector. 
Energy efficiency obligations targets final energy consumption, where energy efficiency 
performance is designated to be carried out in energy end-use, which is most often in 
buildings or through appliances. The EED thus takes EUs energy efficiency policies one step 
further from what they were, by unifying different instruments and regulations that has been 
adopted (principally the Directives from 2004 and 2006) into a larger piece of legislation. 
Another important aspect of the EED is that it also places a clear responsibility on delivering 
energy savings on the energy suppliers by those member states that opt to introduce energy 













Figure 3: Timeline of central EU acts within the energy efficiency domain.  
16.12.2002: Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) (2002/91/EC). 
11.02.2004: Directive for Combined Heat and Power Production (CHP) (2004/8/EC). 
22.06.2005: Doing More with Less; Green Paper on Energy Efficiency. 
06.07.2005: Eco-design Directive (2005/32/EC). 
15.04.2006: Directive on energy end-use efficiency and services (2006/32/EC). 
19.10.2006: Action Plan for Energy Efficiency: Realising the Potential. 
13.11.2008: Second Strategic Energy Review: EU Energy Security and Solidarity Action        
Plan.  
18.11.2008: Energy efficiency – delivering the 20 percent target.  
08.06.2009 – 03.08.2009: Evaluation and Revision of the Action Plan for Energy Efficiency. 
Public consultation.  
23.06.2009: Synthesis of the complete assessment of all 27 National Energy Efficiency 
Action Plans (NEEAPs) by the Commission.  
29.11.2009: Recast of European Eco-design Directive (2009/125/EC). 
19.05.2010: Recast Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (2010/31/EU) 
18.06.2010: Energy labeling Directive (2010/30/EU).  
8.3.2011: The Energy Efficiency Plan 2011.   
8.3.2011: Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon economy in 2050.  
22.6. 2011: Commissions proposal for the Energy Efficiency Directive. 
15.02.2012 – 18.05.2012: Commission consultation on financial sources for investing in 
Energy Efficiency. 
25.10.2012: Energy Efficiency Directive officially adopted (2012/27/EU).   
30.04.2013: National Energy Efficiency Action Plans (NEEAPs) submitted by member states 





2.2 Energy Efficiency Policy Designs and 
Instruments in the EU Member Countries 
The energy efficiency policy landscape varies from country to country, even though many governments have 
similar motivations for pursuing energy efficiency and face similar barriers to implementing policy. 
 (IEA 2010: 33).       
 
Stemming from the energy crisis in 1973 where the supply of oil was drastically reduced, all 
European countries had developed some sorts of national energy efficiency policy by the 
middle of the decade (Waide and Buchner 2008; Bertoldi et.al. 2010; IEA 2010). Among the 
current nationally existing energy efficiency policy schemes, many EU member countries 
have introduced variations over same policy instruments. In Europe today, France, Italy, 
Denmark, the United Kingdom (UK), and the region of Flanders in Belgium have 
independently undertaken different versions of Energy Supplier Obligations (ESO)
7
 or TWCs 
(Bertoldi et.al. 2010). More recently, countries such as Poland, Bulgaria and Romania have 
announced in their NEEAPs the intention to establish policy instruments that regulate energy 
end-use (Steuwer 2013: 363). Such ESO-regulation/TWCs are usually either adopted as a 
stand-alone policy or as a part of a larger system of certification, with the additional 
possibility of trading with certificates (Bertoldi et.al 2010). The common feature of the policy 
design of Energy Supplier Obligations is that energy companies involved in the whole energy 
chain (from production to retailers) are obliged to attain a quantity of energy savings target 
within a limited date, usually determined by the government ministry or regulator (Steuwer 
2013: 32). The targets are set politically and can first be expressed in a relative number (such 
as percentage) on how much the energy consumption shall be reduced, and thereafter become 
converted to an absolute target calculated after earlier amounts of energy supplied and/or 
extrapolations for future energy consumption (Steuwer 2013: 32). When the saving 
obligations is formulated as quota and certificated so that it is guaranteed that an amount of 
savings has been attained, an administrative system that facilitates the option to trade is also 
required to establish a TWC scheme (Steuwer 2013: 32; Bertoldi et.al. 2010). Attained energy 
efficiency savings have to be verified by an independent party which administers and 
oversees compliance, while another public body authorizes the validity of energy savings, 
with the authority to sanction if necessary (Bertoldi et.al 2010: 1455 – 56; Steuwer 2013). 
                                                 
7
 The Energy Efficiency Obligations is the name for the policy instrument used in the EED text, although it 
pertains to a form of ESO instrument. Bertoldi et.al (2010) refers to the policy instrument by the name Energy 
Savings Obligations, although they are only different labels for the same measure.   
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Moreover, the obligation on energy suppliers does not equal an absolute cap of energy 
delivered to the end-users, hence increasing energy efficiency does not equal an absolute 
reduction of energy consumption, although the target (most often TWh) is expressed in an 
absolute quantity (Steuwer 2013: 33). In those countries where the possibility to trade exists, 
energy companies might also buy the needed quotas through TWCs from other actors. 
Companies can chose to implement measures directly in end-use sectors or make 
arrangements with other parties such as own daughter companies or hired third parties, (often 
so called Energy Service Companies - ESCOs), to do it for them (Bertoldi et.al 2010; Stewuer 
2013: 33). These national schemes generally differ in terms of energy efficiency financing, 
measurement and overall system boundaries. Some countries measure their savings in either 
in primary energy
8
, final energy or directly counting CO2-savings from the obligations 
(Bertoldi et.al. 2010). A common feature of the implementation process is to determine how 
savings are to be measured, which is usually done by defining a reference scenario, either on 
an ante or post basis
9
 (Bertoldi et.al.2010: 1455). Only in France and Italy, trading with 
established policy portfolios for supplier obligations exists in combination with full tradable 
certificates, whereas Denmark, the UK and the region of Flanders in Belgium relies on 
subsidies or partially government financial support to perform energy efficient installations 
(Bertoldi et.al. 2010). Countries such as Denmark and France have also incorporated non 
grid-bound types of energy such as CHP and liquid gas (LPG) in their national schemes 
(Bertoldi et.al. 2010: 1463 – 64).  
2.3 Market barriers to energy efficiency  
Energy efficiency is the most cost effective way to reduce emissions, improve energy security 
and competitiveness, make energy consumption more affordable for consumers as well as 
create employment, including in export industry. Above all, it provides tangible benefits to 
citizens: average energy savings for a household can amount to €1 000 per year. 
         (Commission 2010:6)  
 
 
The advantages of energy efficiency have for a long time been identified by the IEA, the 
Commission as well as other actors. For instance, a recent study by the German development 
                                                 
8
 Primary energy is produced at the source; final energy is measured at the amount supplied to the end-users 
(IEA 2013).  
9
 Energy savings calculated in comparison with the energy use before or after an installation is undertaken. 
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bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) stated that for each euro invested in energy 
efficiency by the public, four euros are accrued back to the government in forms of increased 
tax receipts from employment and reduced energy costs in Germany (KfW 2013; Euractiv 
2013b). One could perhaps expect that if energy efficiency upgrades were really that 
beneficial as the quote indicates, these unexploited and easy-gained profits would have been 
picked already. The answer to why this is not the case is that the obstacles towards energy 
efficiency can be seen as a complex case of market failure. A market failure is present when 
the markets are not accountable in an adequate way for the “true cost of their economic 
activity” (Commission 2007: 3). The underlying purpose of regulatory intervention is to 
correct these market failures. The justification for intervention is to attain a more cost-
effective outcome, which appears to be similar for the motivation to invest in renewable 
energy: “inadequate energy security and climate protection with negative consequences for 
the public interest” (Szarka 2010: 843). With regard to energy efficiency, this can be done by 
for instance influencing prices (trough taxation or incentives) or limiting absolute quantities 
(emission trading), as well as providing firms with an incentive to pursue innovation and 
investments in new technologies (Commission 2007: 3 – 6).  
 
To improve the energy performance of the existing building stock, a strong regulatory 
intervention is needed. A general obstacle towards increased energy efficiency policies stems 
from the sheer potential number of parties involved, since reducing energy consumption spans 
nearly all sectors of society (Henningsen 2011: 132). For households, firms and private 
energy consumers, the main barriers can generally be ascribed to high transaction costs in 
assessing their energy use as well as constraints on access to capital, together with a lack of 
awareness of the energy saving potential. The transactions costs includes the costs of 
gathering, assessing and applying information about potential savings measures, as well as 
negotiating and enforcing such contracts with third parties (Schleich and Gruber 2008: 453). 
Constrained access to capital entails that firms or households may not profit from energy 
efficient installations when the interest rates from private capital to undertake installations are 
higher than the expected payoff from the upgrades. To pay for building renovation and/or 
installing new appliances, the start up costs are also high relative to the long pay-back period 
of energy efficiency actions (Commission 2011a). At last, the consumers demand side for 
energy efficiency installations would also have to be strengthened since there is a general lack 
of awareness for energy service performance contracting (Commission 2011a). The EED 
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achieves to ease some of these hindrances by defining energy savings obligations and 
defining hitherto common monitoring methodologies, as well as providing different sources 
of finance (Commission 2012)
10
.   
2.4 Proposed Policy Instruments in the EED 
The Commission did not propose any binding energy efficiency targets in the EED proposal; 
instead it put forth policy means. The policy designs of these are thus of central importance. 
The main regulatory interventions in the Commissions proposal can be said to be the 
instrument of Energy Efficiency Obligations, which is the policy instrument that has the 
potential to deliver the highest amount of energy savings.  The proposed 3 percent renovation 
rate of public building would be an immediate energy efficiency trigger for the building 
sector. This section explains the two relevant policy instruments as they were set forth in the 
Commissions proposal, namely the EEO and the prescription for three percent annual public 
building renovation.  
 
The logic behind targeting the utilities for implementing such policy instruments that regulate 
energy efficiency among the final consumers is that they already have a contractual 
relationship with the customer. They can therefore better assess the “how much energy it is 
sold to whom and at what time”, and they often possess the capacity to undertake energy 
efficiency installations by having the much needed technical comptence (Waide and Buchner 
2008: 304 – 305). Energy companies do also often have the relevant energy efficiency 
technology at their disposal, as well as being in a better position to develop energy efficiency 
solutions (Waide and Buchner 2008; Henningsen 2011: 140). Imposing an obligation on 
utilities to sell less of their main commodity might seem like a paradox; however EEOs will 
not change their business model in the short term. But when the energy suppliers are imposed 
to reduce the energy consumption of their customers, this can somewhat change their business 
relationship with the consumers from being only energy suppliers, to become energy 
efficiency service providers (Waide and Buchner 2008; Bertoldi et.al.2010: 1468). This can 
be for instance installing extra insulation or a heating system in the customers’ buildings for 
                                                 
10
 In the EED, possible funding sources could from the European level could be made available from the 
European Investment Bank, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the Council of Europe 
Development Bank (Commission 2012: 8).  
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either a large upfront fee, or a long term payback by the customers’ energy bill. If EEOs are 
implemented efficiently, such policy schemes can be central to facilitate renovation of the 
building stock in the long run (EED guidebook 2013b). The EEO scheme can possibly be 
seen as a weak redistributive policy instrument, as it places the responsibility for undertaking 
energy efficiency installations is directed on the energy suppliers instead of putting any 
requirements on the consumers (Majone 1996: 63). In the Commissions proposal, a 
mandatory energy savings in final consumption of 1.5 percent by energy retailers or 
transmitters was set forth (Commission 2011c: 20). However, the obliged energy suppliers 
can chose themselves in which sector to deliver the savings (such for instance industry), but 
the largest potential for energy savings lies in the residential sector.   
 
The other central policy prescription in the EED proposal was a mandatory 3 percent 
renovation rate of the public building stock by the national governments. Today, the current 
rates of building renovation lies at 1 percent annually for the EU as a whole and it is expected 
that in order to achieve the 2050 target, a renovation rate of 2.5 percent is required (BPIE 
2010: 108 – 110). It is therefore a need for more building renovation, and the EED proposal 
emphasized that public authorities at all levels should “fulfill an exemplary role” when it 
comes to energy performance in buildings (Commission 2011c). Renovation of the public 
building stock would also trigger market demand for energy efficiency services by 





3 Theoretical frameworks  
There is no perfect model of interest group representation in the EU (Hix and Høyland 2011: 
162). Therefore, different theories must therefore be applied in conjugation. Firstly, pluralism 
and corporatism is briefly outlined as general background concepts. Then a model of supply 
and demand for resources between European institutions and interest groups is presented and 
formulated expectations with regard to how interests groups lobbied the Commission. Since 
formal coalition building occurs seldom at the EU level, it will not be formulated any clear 
hypotheses due to little theory and empirics, instead tentative expectations are put forth.  
3.1 Classic models for interest group representation 
Pluralism and corporatism are the traditional ideal types for understanding interest 
intermediation structures (Hix and Høyland 2011; Michalowitz 2002). Pluralism is the 
classical model to understand interest groups representation in democratic systems. In an ideal 
pluralist paradigm, there is always one interest group on each side of every argument (Hix and 
Høyland 2011: 159). A central requirement for a pluralistic system to function is that interest 
groups must have equal access to the political process (Hix and Høyland 2011: 160). 
However, groups can seldom mobilize the same amount of resources, which can bias the 
access to policy makers. Neo-pluralism claims that this inherent distortion in pluralism can be 
surmounted if bureaucrats deliberately support groups economically (Hix and Høyland 2011: 
161). In the EU, some interest groups have acquired an insider position over time, a so called 
“elite pluralism” arrangement (Coen 1997). Here, private interest groups dominate over 
“diffuse” interest due to more resources, a trustworthy reputation and thereby being in a better 
position to provide information (Coen 1997; Dür and de Bièvre 2007a; Coen and Richardson 
2009: 152; Chalmers 2013b: 10). A critic of the pluralist assumptions can be found in the 
foundational work by Mancur Olson (1971) [1965], where interest intermediation is 
understood in terms of collective action. Olson points out that the abilities for large and small 
groups to organize themselves are uneven:  
“The smaller groups – the privileged and intermediate groups – can often defeat the large 
groups – the latent groups – which are normally supposed to prevail in a democracy. The 
privileged and intermediate groups often triumph over the numerically superior forces in the 
latent or large groups because the former are generally organized and active while the latter 




Benefits are more easily acquired by smaller groups due to stronger incentives for mobilizing 
compared to latent groups. However, understanding membership in Euro-federations deviates 
somewhat from Olson`s view since they encompass different organizations such as firms, 
national associations and NGOs (Greenwood and Cram 1996). The incentives to join a Euro-
federation are neither only material; membership is also vindicated through reducing policy 
uncertainty and access to information (Greenwood and Cram 1996). McLaughlin and Jordan 
(1993) conceive the rationality of collective action at the EU level with the associated cost of 
non-membership, as firms without representation have to pay a higher price for equivalent 
information (Greenwood and Cram 1996; Greenwood 2011: 68). The informational demand 
can also reduce groups’ inclination to free-ride. Many public interest groups in Brussels 
derive much of their funding from various Directorate Generales (DGs), making Olson`s 
critic of pluralism exaggerated (Greenwood 2011: 3; Hix and Høyland 2011: 161). 
3.1.1 On the Limits of Pluralism and Corporatism  
Following from the treaty of Rome, it was attempted to establish passage of corporatism in 
EUs decision making process, by granting interest groups formal standing in the Economic 
and Social Committee (Hix and Høyland 2011: 170). However, this committee is only 
consultative and has retained a weak position in the EU policy process (Eising 2007b: 385). 
The EU clearly lacks the means to intermediate across sectors to the same degree as 
corporatism would posit (Streeck and Schmitter 1991), whereas old structures such as 
business and labor have eroded and new cleavages emerged (Hix and Høyland 2011: 161). 
Pluralism and corporatism are also concepts developed on the presence of statehood, thus 
important conditions are missing (Kohler-Koch 1997: 5 – 6); corporatism at the EU level 
lacks direct and binding participation, while the pluralist assumption of equal access is not 
fulfilled (Michalowitz 2002: 43 – 44). Both concepts could also co-exist across different 
policy areas and legislative stages (Michalowitz 2002: 50). The preferences of decision 
makers and interest groups’ incentives in the relevant sector ought to be studied in order to 
understand policy processes (Andersen and Eliassen 1995; Falkner 2000; Hix and Høyland 




3.2 A Model of Resource Exchange  
Lobbying in Brussels is widely seen as an exchange where the currency is information 
(Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2009; Broscheid and Coen 2007; Gullberg 2011; Chalmers 2013a; 
Chalmers 2013b). Studying the exchange of information can be done in terms of both demand 
side and supply side factors (Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2009; Chalmers 2013a; Chalmers 
2013b). Since organizations are rarely self-contained with the resources, they often have to 
make a transaction with other organizations to achieve their goals (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 
2: Bouwen 2002). A form of interdependence can therefore be established. On the demand 
side, the European institution and the legislative stage determine the organizations preferences 
for information (Bouwen 2002). During the pre-proposal phase, the Commission is assumed 
to be a strategic actor and have a primary interest in tabling proposals which will be passed by 
the other institutions (Hix and Høyland 2011: 35 – 37). In addition, it also needs to have 
legitimacy behind its proposal (Broscheid and Coen 2003; Klüver 2011a). This could for 
instance to have its proposal backed by popular support or by key market players (Klüver 
2013: 45 – 49). On the supply side, interest groups will provide the decision makers in the 
European institution with information to gain access. Chalmers conceive this to be a function 
of interest groups capacity to monitor policy developments, gather and provide information, 
together with their strategies for transmitting it (2011; 2013a). In return for providing 
resources to the Commission, they can get access and thereby influence policy proposals. 
Figure 4 present such a demand and supply model for resource exchange. But interest groups 
might also form a coalition in order to enhance their policy claim. Interest groups might 
produce or gather information through a coalition to improve their delivery of access goods. 






Figure 4: A demand and supply model for resource exchange.  
Source: modified after Klüver 2013: 17 
 
3.2.1 The Commissions Need for Information as a Policy Initiator  
To explain the Commissions informational need, Bouwens framework (2002; 2004; 2009) of 
access goods will be employed to analyze the informational demand side. Access goods are 
goods non-state actors have to offer to the relevant EU institution in order to gain access. 
These goods are usually different types of information and can be hierarchically ranged. The 
different types of information can also be divided into two separate categories, namely Expert 
Knowledge (EK) and political salient information (Chalmers 2011: 46; Mahoney 2008). In 
drafting proposals, the Commission is assumed to be in highest need of Expert Knowledge 
(Bouwen 2002: 379). Expert knowledge concerns the expertise and technical know-how it 
requires from the private sector to understand the market which is subject to regulation. Since 
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interest groups have specialized information on how a proposal can translate into policies and 
its potential consequences, these can be traded for access to policy-makers (Bouwen 2002; 
2009). Private firms should be the most successful in providing EK, since they are directly in 
touch with the market and can gather information more easily than European associations 
(Bouwen 2002; 2009). However, the Commission does not only seek technical information, 
but also political information as well. Bouwen consider the European association’s main 
strength to provide reliable information about the European policy dimension, which he labels 
the European Encompassing Interest (EEI) (Bouwen 2002; Bouwen 2009). An interest is 
more encompassing the more affected parties that are involved in its formulation. In a later 
study by Bouwen (2004), it was demonstrated that the Commission preferred information 
from European associations, which have a competitive advantage in providing information 
about the overall needs of their policy sector. For the Commission, European umbrella 
organizations are especially attractive, since they are specialized in brokering out their 
common interest at the European level (Bouwen 2002: 377; Bouwen 2004). Another type of 
political information which the Commission needs concerns information about the 
preferences of relevant domestic actors, but only if a proposal has a high level of saliency in a 
member state (Bouwen 2002). This is labeled the Domestic Encompassing Interest (DEI). 
Unless a member state position on a given issue is of high importance, DEI is usually of 
inferior value to the Commission since it is generally concerned with the European policy 
dimension. It should therefore be expected, that the Commission demanded more EK than 
political information from interest groups, and then EEI over DEI.  
3.2.2 Actor Supply of Access Goods to the Commission 
In the first section, the informational demand by the Commission was made account for. 
However, a systematic approach to the supply side of information has been less developed 
until recent studies. By assuming the information provision of an interest group to be derived 
from their organizational form, Bouwens framework is intuitive, but according to Rainer 
Eising, also “piecemeal” (2007b: 385). Since more elaborate theories on how groups can 
produce the demanded information has been little systematically examined, this section sets 
forth some assumptions about the supply of access goods to the Commission on basis of 
combining insights from two recent articles by Adam Chalmers (2011; 2013a). In contrast 
with Eisings emphasis on how resources counts for interest groups supply of information 
(2007b; 2009), Chalmers considers the interest groups influence as a result of their capacity to 
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process information. In the first article, Chalmers considers the influence of interest groups to 
be caused by their capabilities to gather information and lobby strategies (2011), while in the 
latter he sets forth which types of information that gives highest access to the EU institutions 
(Chalmers 2013a). In subsequent chapters, some these proposition both with regard to 
information production and lobbying tactics will be examined. 
 
To gain access to policy-makers in the Commission, interest groups have to provide the 
demanded goods. When studying Euro-federations supply of information to the Commission, 
their capacity to meet the required demand have to be examined (Chalmers 2013a). In a 
detailed examination of information types, Chalmers finds out that interest groups which 
supply expert knowledge such, as feasibility information in particular, gets more frequent 
access to the Commission (Chalmers 2013a: 49). But for an interest group to supply such 
information, the interest groups capacity to produce relevant information must be taken into 
account. Being efficient in producing information also involves the regular “pre-advocacy” 
tasks such as monitoring policy developments and gathering information (Chalmers 2011; 
2013b: 13). Chalmers refers to this as information processing: how interest groups gather their 
information, including their strategy to transmit it (2011: 476). The interest groups ability to 
gather information consists of their capacity to monitor policy developments through different 
sources, while the interest groups research strategies concern how they produce relevant 
policy information (Chalmers 2011: 472). Those interest groups who are able to monitor 
policy developments more closely, could  have an advantage in anticipating what information 
that will eventually be needed. As such, being embedded in a larger network could give 
interest groups an advantage by getting information from others “by word of mouth” 
(Chalmers 2011: 477; 2013b). However, the type of information produced also matters. Good 
information entails a given exclusiveness, which implies that the receiver can hardly obtain 
the same information from other sources (Chalmers 2011: 474; 2013a: 51). The more 
evidence based type of research information it is, the better. Interest groups can produce 
relevant policy research in-house or delegate it to third parties (Chalmers 2011: 478). Policy 
information must also be timely and relevant for what the decision makers have on the agenda 
(Chalmers 2011: 475 – 476). The interest groups capacity to monitor policy developments and 
to produce relevant policy information is therefore intertwined. It could thus be expected that 





Other aspects of informational supply by interest groups can be found in what has been called 
resource dependency. A critical resource dependency is the criticality of a resource which an 
organization needs in order to continue functioning (Beyers and Kerremans 2007). 
Controlling the supply of information when the receiver organization is highly dependent 
upon it is thought to yield high influence for an interest group (Bouwen 2002; Eising 2009: 
172). The decision makers and interest groups could therefore grow into becoming dependent 
on another (Eising 2009: 172 – 175). However, an organizations influence over another does 
not depend on the sheer amount of information it can supply, but to what extent the receiver 
organization can replace the information from other sources (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978: 46). 
If such a relationship occurred over a protracted amount of time between the Commission and 
interest groups, it could possibly be ascribed to relationship of resource dependency. 
However, policy makers could are expected to be reluctant and prefer avoiding to be caught in 
a relationship where one or few groups control the information due to the leverage this gives 
them (Potters and van Winden 1992; Richardson 2000). Although some interest groups were 
probably more active in supplying information to the Commission than others, the 
relationship to the Commission should not be expected in lasting such an extent that it can be 
characterized as a resource dependency.   
Lobbying strategies and information transmission by the interest groups 
The channels through which interest groups can chose to send their message are subsumed 
within two general strategies interest groups uses to gain influence, namely “insider” or 
“outsider” lobbying. An “insider” strategy entails working with decision-makers while using 
an “outsider” strategy can for instance be media campaigns or demonstrations (Binderkrantz 
and Krøyer 2012). An insider lobbying strategy has been found to be more effective in order 
to get access to decision makers than using outside tactics (Beyers 2004; Eising 2007c), 
because one would generally do better to approach officials with hard facts and figures when 
the issue is of a more technical art (Binderkrantz and Krøyer 2012). Especially during the pre-
legislative stage when the Commission is assumed to be in need for technical information 
(Bouwen 2002), an insider strategy can be assumed to be more favorable to get access. It is 
therefore reasonable to expect that interest groups used insider strategies in order to get access 




In order to be efficient information suppliers, interest groups must also decide on how to 
allocate their scarce resources and which strategies that can provide them the highest 
probabilities for success (Hojnacki 1997: 62). The transmission of information is concerned 
with through which mediums interest groups decide to supply their information (Chalmers 
2011: 478 – 479).  Klüver (2011a; 2013) studies mainly information supply in terms of length 
of online consultations submitted by interests groups. But issuing position papers in only one 
out of many channels a group can use to reach decision makers. In order to be efficient in 
transmitting information, it could be useful for an interest group to create “new” points of 
access. It is therefore favorable to have a more extensive repertory in order to deliver 
information to decision makers (Chalmers 2011: 472 – 473; Baumgartner and Leech 1998: 
148). This could for instance be through different mediums such as organizing a conference 
or host a workshop. It can therefore be expected that those interest groups who had a larger 
repertory for delivering information also got higher access to the Commission. 
3.3 Coalition Formation and Interest Group 
Interaction 
The study will use earlier works on interest groups coalitional behavior as the point of 
departure in order to explain formal coalition building between European associations 
(Hojnacki 1997;1998; Pijneburg: 1998; Hula 1999; Warleigh 2000; Mahoney 2007a; 2008). 
Most research on when and why interest groups form policy coalitions has been done within 
the context of American politics (Hojnacki 1997; 1998; Hula 1999). This might be because 
coalition building at the European stage occurs rather seldom, although it is not “entirely 
absent” from the EU political level (Mahoney 2008: 182). Mahoney conceive the reason for 
this to be that because of Euro-federations broad membership structure, by being almost 
“coalitions by themselves” already (2007a: 368; 2008). Evidence from coalition formation 
among American interest groups suggests that building joint positions is the preferred way to 
lobby on issues, since pursuing a coalition strategy is perceived as the best option in order to 
influence policy outcomes (Hula 1999: 25). Applied to the European stage, the little research 
on actual coalition building is not entirely consistent: Mahoney (2007a; 2008: 174) finds little 
overall support that Euro-federations joins coalitions at all compared to American interest 
groups, while Warleigh (2000) conceives that especially NGOs at the EU level have a habit of 
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working together with business actors to advance their claims. Less is therefore known under 
what conditions interest groups in the EU decide to establish common positions. Hojnacki 
et.al notes (2012: 10 – 11) that due to the overall little research on the coalitional activity of 
interest groups, variables should be employed as only “preliminary” and “suggestive”. As 
such, the theoretical propositions behind investigating coalition formation and later intra-
group dynamics have to remain tentative. The decision of interest groups to form coalitions 
must be seen against the background in which they operate, since all organizations are 
entrenched in their environment. Ultimately, lobbying is so to speak with Chalmers words, an 
“inherently interactive” activity (2013a: 41). The background of coalition building is thus the 
policy subsystem in which the interest groups operates. A large number of actors and 
institutions found in each area or sector constitute a policy subsystem (Howlett et.al. 2009: 
81). The energy efficiency area can be seen as an independent subsystem within the larger 
energy and climate sector. Accordingly, the resources of the different interest groups within a 
subsystem can be assumed to be dispersed among them, and that they have to cooperate in 
order to be effective (Hojnacki 1997; Hojnacki 1998; Carpenter et.al 2004; Chalmers 2013b). 
Heike Klüver emphasize in her quantitative text analysis that coalition lobbying is a constant 
feature of EU policy making, by conceiving all organizations that work for the same goal as 
de facto coalitions (2011a; 2011b 2012a; 2013). However, this approach makes the concept of 
formal coalition building between interest groups impossible, as it implies that all groups 
which share preferences constitutes a coalition, even if they don’t know each other.  
 
Evidence about coalition formation at the EU levels suggests that coalitions mostly take the 
form of being so called ad-hoc coalitions or alliances (Pinjeburg 1998; Warleigh 2000; 
Mahoney 2007a; Mahoney 2008). Ad-hoc coalitions or so called issue networks are generally 
recognized by having lack of stability and whereas the membership is fluid and unpredictable 
(Heclo 1978; Richardson 2000: 1008, 1016; Mahoney 2008). Contrary to other models of 
networks such as iron triangles or policy communities, ad-hoc coalitions are recognized by 
being open and consisting of a loose connection of people that have a mutual concern over an 
issue, little interdependence and being relatively open to new members (Heclo 1978; Marsh 
1998: 14; Bernhagen 2007: 36 Hula 1999; 4 – 8; Richardson 2000). Another type of 
cooperation between interest groups and decision makers has been labeled a policy 
community, which has more stable relationships, fewer participants and exchange of 
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resources (Marsh 1998: 14). However, features of policy communities to be found at the EU 
level are unlikely due to the many interest groups present and EUs multi-level governance 
nature (Richardson 2000). Hula conceives that defining such ad-hoc coalitions more 
accurately to be practically impossible, since the boundaries of membership is already 
assumed to fluctuate (1999: 4 – 8). Discussing membership in side an ad-hoc coalition could 
therefore be contradictory (Hula 1999: 4). According to Mahoney, ad-hoc coalitions are often 
recognized by having members that represents different types of interests (Mahoney 2008: 
168). It is thus a type of collaboration between actors from different policy areas. An ad-hoc 
coalition is the cooperation between heterogeneous interest groups which unite forces in order 
to fight for a single issue, either in the short or medium term (Mahoney 2008: 168). Mahoney 
conceives the degree of coalition as a continuum; from “informal and loose” to coordinated 
entities with “logos and secretariat” (Mahoney 2008: 167). The shared features of ad-hoc 
coalition are thus a low degree of formalization and a high degree of autonomy for the 
members (Pijneburg 1998; Mahoney 2008: 168). Although there is usually a type of 
leadership in the coalition, they do not tend to establish own membership or any 
organizational structure (Mahoney 2008: 168). In the case of the EED, European associations 
did chose to establish a formal coalition with an organizational structure and staff. The study 
is thus preoccupied with which factors that can explain such coalition building. In subsequent 
chapters, theories and evidence from earlier research will be employed to test under what 
conditions issue specific coalitions develop and what facilitates cooperation inside a coalition.   
3.3.1 Causes for Coalition Building among Euro-federations 
This section outlines different causes for coalition building between interest groups on the 
background of earlier theory and empirical evidence. Based on earlier evidence from 
(Mahoney (2008: 172), the main contributing factors to explain coalition formations are the 
characteristics of involved actors and the political context of the issue nature. Mahoney 
considers the political context in terms of institutional factors and the specific nature of the 
policy area as the main factors contributing to coalition formation in the EU and the US 
(2008). This study will therefore concentrate on the issue specific factors in order to explain 
coalition building related to the energy efficiency domain. The different organizational and 




In broad terms, interest groups decide to establish coalitions based on a perception on how to 
increase their chance for lobbying success (Hojnacki 1997). Mahoney (2008: 168) perceives 
coalitions to be advantageous from two aspects; first it communicates a signal where the 
majority of support on an issue lies, and secondly it can be a more efficient mode of 
cooperation when resources are pooled. Since the American interest group population is 
recognized by groups which are often smaller and have fewer resources than in in the EU, 
American groups are more inclined to establish coalitions (Mahoney 2007a; 2008: 171). 
However, in the EU, lack of resources does not seem to be the primary cause for groups to 
establish coalitions, but the contrary: in those few events coalition building between European 
interest groups occur, it is usually more materially bestowed groups that displays most 
coalitional behavior (Mahoney 2008: 178 – 180). A shared feature of European interest 
groups that are prone to collaborate is instead that they have done a lot previous experience in 
collaborating (Mahoney 2008). Hojnacki (1997) finds out that purposive groups (groups 
representing a social or public interests, such as environmental NGOs), are more likely to 
engage in cooperation with other actors due to scarcity of resources and the habit of 
collaboration, than groups that rely only on material incentives. This is supported by Warleigh 
(2000) which finds out that coalition building could very well be the preferred advocacy 
strategy and especially for NGOs. Warleigh further points out that NGOs often have to work 
as “hustlers”, because in order to enhance their policy claim, they would do better in teaming 
up with groups that have competence on questions related to market and technology (2000: 
232). In general, those interest groups that have previous experience in collaborating with 
others groups are more inclined to establish coalitions (Hojacnki 1997: 78). This is supported 
by other findings on interest groups behavior in larger networks where the inter-
organizational trust is essential for groups to develop positions. Carpenter et.al. (2004: 243) 
finds out that in the American context, the phenomenon of “friendly lobbying” is not only 
confined to interest groups and aligned politicians, but also occurs between organized 
interests themselves. Interest groups are more prone to seek out the opinion of other 
organizations who share the same view and preferences to develop a “coherent interpretation 
of a policy” and exchange information (Carpenter et.al 2004: 243). Those interest groups that 
have already established linkages or partnerships with other interest groups could thus be 




In the American context, Marie Hojnacki (1997) examines 5 different cases of coalition 
building among interest groups with a survey of the involved members. Her findings support 
that interest groups are most likely to join an ad-hoc coalitions based on their assessments of 
the opportunity to increase their chance to be successful. However, the perceptions of what is 
necessary in order to achieve success might vary across policy fields. According to Hula, the 
causes for an interest group to establish or join a coalition are also a question about when it is 
convenient to employ such strategies (1999: 53). Therefore the issue context and the 
constellations of other actors are relevant for a interest groups decision to join a coalition. 
Especially in cases where the policy content is complex and when the competencies are 
dispersed among several actors, the likelihood of cooperation increases (Hula 1999: 3 – 5, 
26). Hula (1999) considers the tendency for increased collaboration among American interest 
groups as a reflection of a change in the US interest group population as a whole, where the 
number of interest groups has proliferated and become more fragmented in terms of 
specialization. Hence, when the policy subject is complicated and cuts across many interest 
constituencies such as in energy efficiency, interest group cooperation is more likely. But the 
level of conflict and issue salience for the stakeholder also matters (Mahoney 2008: 180). In 
the five different cases of coalition building at the European level Mahoney examines, the 
highest degree of interest group mobilization for coalition building occurs when the issue at 
stake is conflictual and there are opposing views on the policy subject (2008: 179). This is in 
accordance with earlier studies in the US context, where interest groups are found to be more 
prone in joining coalition if there is substantial opposition on the issue (Hojnacki 1997). Also, 
the perceived strength of the opposition is matters as well; “when opponents are strong, 
organizations will see greater benefits in joining a coalition” (Hojnacki 1997: 67). The contest 
on an issue and the relative opposition an interest group face can be seen against the 
adversaries which it confronts, such as those who either prefers the status quo to prevail, 
impose a cost, or deny a benefit to the members of their members (Holyoke 2009: 362). The 
issue characteristic is thus central, since European associations are also more likely to join a 
coalition when the policy content has “multiple viewpoints (Mahoney 2008: 180).  It should 
therefore be expected that when there are groups with different angles to their issues, they are 
prone to seek out a coalition. Moreover, the goal of a coalition should also be formulated 
simple enough so that is meaningful for groups to be pro- or against the stated objective (Hula 
1999: 30 – 32). This is often favorable when the coalitions takes a proactive stance (such as 
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changing the status quo) and coalesce around a target to which “groups can rally” (Hula 1999: 
30 – 32). 
 
As mentioned, European associations did initiate a coalition called the Coalition for Energy 
Savings during the pre-legislative period of the EED. Taken together, it can be expected that 
the major determinants behind the decision to establish Coalition for Energy Savings was 
shared concerns over the status of energy efficiency, although in conjugation with both 
organizational and issue specific factors. The organizational characteristics are considered by 
the interest groups character such as the previous habits of collaborating with other interest 
groups. Especially seeking out different partners for cooperation should be expected for 
purposive groups. In terms of issue context, when the interest group population and 
specialization is scattered, coalition building should also be expected as a more efficient lobby 
strategy. If there is a relatively large opposition on the policy subject, then this should also 
contribute to the decision to join a coalition. Finally, the goal of the coalition must be 
sufficiently open so that groups can join without having to compromise too much on details.     
3.3.2 Intra-Coalition Behavior  
This section considers the internal dynamics within coalitions and which factors that 
contributes to intra-group coherence. Pijneburg (1998: 307) points out ad-hoc coalitions are 
prone to encounter problems due to high internal transaction costs. These can for instance be 
major hurdles for a coalition to function, such as agreeing on positions, distribute burdens and 
tasks, as well as facilitating internal exchange of information (Pijneburg 1998: 307). 
However, such collective action problems can be overcome if anybody is willing to take on 
the task of becoming a coalition leader and/or work as a secretariat and thereby facilitate 
internal cohesion. Hojnacki finds out that forming a coalition also provide groups with an 
opportunity to free-ride on their members, although this inclination can decrease when 
interaction happens regularly (1998: 444). A group that attempts to evade the commitments 
can thereby be recognized and their reputational inside the coalition might suffer (Hojnacki 
1998: 444). Trust building over time can also be essential for groups to conitiue working 
together. Having an established structure with a coalition broker that facilitates coordination 
could thus contribute to the reduced likelihood for free-riding and increased accountability 
(Hojnacki 1998: 455 – 456). The problem of free-riding can be solved by establishing a 
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degree of formalization in a coalition and offer selective benefits that gives groups a reason to 
further stay inside it. Hula considers the most relevant benefit for a group to join or remain 
inside a coalition as information, unless if it has a purposive motivation (1999: 34 – 35). This 
information could for instance be news about the most recent updates and different threats 
towards the interest groups’ positions or information related to policy research (Hula 1999: 34 
– 35). This could also for instance be relevant information such as access to information from 
research reports. In general, when the degree of formalization increases, groups contributed 
more to a coalition. It could therefore be expected that increasing the degree of formalization 
to over come initial transaction costs, and providing benefits such as information sharing 
facilitated intra-group cohesion.  
3.4 Summary of Theoretical Expectations 
This chapter has presented a broad theoretical outlook on interest groups relationship with the 
Commission and the policy dynamics between interest groups. The classical models such as 
pluralism and corporatism, serve as a background for the interest intermediation structure. In 
this study, interest groups advocacy efforts towards the Commission are understood in terms 
of demand and supply for information. The Commission is expected to be in highest need of 
technical information, and then political information such as the European encompassing 
interest. On the supply side, groups that have a larger internal capacity to monitor and 
produce information, including a broader repertory of transmission strategies, should be 
expected to have higher access. About coalition formation, interest groups that decide to 
establish and join a coalition did so first and foremost due to shared preferences, but also due 
to important background factors such as the issue context and previous collaboration. 
However, in the order to maintain the coalition, it should be expected that a formal coalition 
design together with benefits of remaining inside the coalition, can facilitate intra-group 
coherence.   
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4 Method  
 
4.1 Research Design 
The research questions of the study are as follows:  
 
1. What kind of “access goods” did the European associations supply to the Commission 
before the EED proposal, and what strategies did they employ to do so? 
2. Why did some of the Euro-federations establish a coalition to promote energy 
efficiency, and how did they aggregate a joint advocacy position among them?  
 
This study is preoccupied with the access goods Euro-federations supplied to the Commission 
during the pre-legislative phase of the EED. Access to policy makers is thought to be a 
general condition for influence in the EU system (Bouwen 2002: 366; Gullberg 2011). This is 
also a study of one particular instance of coalition building between Euro-federations. The 
conditions under which circumstances interest groups decide to collaborate will be identified 
and explained against theory and findings from earlier studies. The qualitative approach was 
employed in studying coalition building because of its benefits over a quantitative approach. 
Namely, with little information about the process of intra-group collaboration available, it was 
necessary to talk to the people involved in the coalition building process from the beginning. 
In the context of US politics Hojnacki (1997; 1998) examines interest groups coalition 
involvement through quantitative surveys across different policy domains. However, unlike in 
US politics, there is less data, theory and evidence available with respect to European interest 
groups, which are generally less induced to form coalitions than their American counterparts. 
Since such actors constellations are believed to occur seldom at the EU stage, an exploratory 
approach by asking open-ended questions is necessary (Bryman 2004; Leech 2002). In order 
to examine the causal process behind interest groups’ decisions’ to engage in formal coalition 
building, covering the different steps of cooperation to provide detailed historical explanation 




Despite the problems attached to studying access as an indicator for influence, other 
alternatives are not more promising (Dür 2008a; 2008b). Other approaches such as both 
measuring preference attainment and conducting a survey have their difficulties (Dür 2008a). 
Determining interest groups’ relative preferences attainment by studying documents such as 
position papers or consultation hearings (see for instance Tingaard Svendsen and Markussen 
2005) has a limited inference drawing potential, since the actual policy process is not studied. 
This method also only looks at one possible lobbying strategy (to issue a written position) and 
not at other channels which groups might utilize to get access. Also, attempting to measure 
interest groups’ preference on a proposal by making a survey of the involved parties would 
risk problems of positive or negative self-representation where influence is either exaggerated 
or lessened  (Dür 2008a: 566 – 567). A survey would also be practically difficult due to the 
low amount of Euro-federations that have specialized competence in energy efficiency. 
Therefore, since the study of informational lobbying by interest groups in conjunction with 
other advocacy strategies has been understudied (Chalmers 2013a: 43), a more circumstantial 
examination should amplify their different claims when concentrating upon the informational 
supply be undertaken. In order to investigate the research questions, a qualitative strategy 
through interviews supported by documents and web sources was therefore chosen.   
4.2 Choosing Case Formats 
John Gerring defines a case study as “the intensive study of a single case where the purpose 
of that study is to shed light on a larger class of cases (a population)” (2007: 20). Studying 
one event intensively should provide explanations to the broader class of events from which it 
is drawn. To answer the two research questions about the Euro-federations approach to the 
EED during the pre-legislative stage of the policy process, a more exploratory approach is 
taken instead of theory testing. To be able to test theories, a coherent theoretical framework 
has already to be presupposed (George and Bennett 2005: 115). Gerring (2007: 39 – 42) 
emphasizes that the strength of case studies lies in developing concepts and contributing to 
theory, rather than attempting to draw inferences with claim to generalizations. Access goods 
supply to the Commission and the formal position building of European interest groups have 
been understudied. Also, studies on information supply by interest groups have not focused 
on their capabilities to gather information through monitoring policy developments and 
research strategies, the exception being Chalmers articles (2011; 2013). This study will 
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therefore try to explore whether better monitoring policy developments and information 
gathering by interest groups together with their information transmission strategies, do 
increase access to the Commission.  
 
Also due to the little body of research on coalition building among Euro-federations, this case 
study will remain explorative and hypothesis-generating, but it shall be based on earlier 
research on coalition formation as the point of departure. This is however not contradictory, 
as George and Bennett states that the search observations can be theory laden, “but doesn`t 
mean that they are theory determined” (2005: 21 – 22). Explorative studies have to clarify in 
advance what is to be explored, either on the basis of empirical evidence or assumed causal 
relationships (George and Bennett 2005: 111 – 112). This approach is recognized by Hojnacki 
which underlines the importance of the context of when and why interest groups decide to 
join coalitions due to the specific nature of the issue (1997: 80). As there are two aspects of 
interest groups advocacy efforts in the study, namely access goods provision and coalition 
building, the study takes a heuristic and theory-building approach through investigating 
different causes for what facilitates access to the Commission, and under what conditions 
interest groups decides to build a coalition. The study will thus attempt to identify causal 
mechanisms from an empirical case study that theory can be built on further (George and 
Bennett 2005: 111).  
 
Some authors consider that the goal of case studies should be primarily to test the causal 
effects of variables on a single outcome, since this can simply the inference drawing potential 
of a study (King, Keohane and Verba 1994). However, the purpose of case studies could also 
be to discover under what circumstances and through which mechanisms a specific event 
occurs (George and Bennett 2005: 31). But from studying only one single instance of 
coalition formation, drawing any conclusive generalizations might be “premature” (Pijneburg 
1998: 317). Also, earlier research has noted that problems arise when drawing general 
inferences from lobbyism through ad-hoc coalitions (Warleigh 2000). This is in line with the 
recommendations by Hojacnki et.al. (2012), since because of the few studies done on 
coalition formation between interest groups, the causes should mainly be seen as 
“suggestive”. The provision of access goods and participating in networks don’t have to be 
independent of each other, since the informational supply of interest groups also depends on 
its capabilities to monitor policy developments (Chalmers 2011). The ability to gather 
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information by interest groups can therefore be interrelated with collaboration, since interest 
groups can cooperate in order to produce access goods more efficiently. Interest groups’ 
provision of information to decision makers does not have to be a solitary pursuit: after all, 
interest groups do not “operate in a vacuum” (Hula 1999: 120). Since energy efficiency is a 
relatively new area to be brought up at the EU level as well as technically demanding, interest 
groups that want to provide access goods to the Commission would do well in cooperating 
with each other. In the case of the EED, many informants reported that a high degree of their 
advocacy efforts went to collaborating, into what was later became a formally adopted 
coalition called the Coalition for Energy Savings. The context in which the various advocates 
lobbied must therefore be paid attention to. A process tracing approach is necessary to explain 
these new actor constellations by clarifying the historical series of events leading up to the 
specific outcome of coalition formation (George and Bennett 2005: 206 – 207). A problem 
with undertaking process tracing studies is to decide on a type of process tracing that fits with 
the phenomena of interest (George and Bennett 2005: 213). The format of this study can be 
seen as an “analytical explanation”. Within it, a historical narrative is explained after some 
tentative expectations according to the factors that are assumed to be conditions for coalition 
building (George and Bennett 2005: 211). Since the factors contributing to coalition building 
can probably co-vary (previous collaborative behavior and issue context) identifying any clear 
variables to test can be problematic. Nevertheless, some tentative explanations related to the 
organizational characteristics and the nature of the issue was set forth in theory section.  
4.3 A Representative Sample of Interest Groups?  
A general problem when conducting case studies is to determine the class of events from 
which it is drawn, and thereby establish its representativeness (Gerring 2007). This is broadly 
a case study of information supply towards the Commission and interaction between interest 
groups during the pre-legislative stage of the EED. The unit of analysis in the study can thus 
be said to be the Euro-federation, whereas the coalition building aspect refers to a historical 
outcome of establishing cooperation between different Euro-federations. Choosing which 
units to draw from the larger population of interest groups was done strategically to answer 
both aspects satisfactorily. When conducting small-N research, it is important that the sample 
selection is done carefully and guided in order to avoid sample bias (Gerring 2007; Levy 
2008: 8). On balance, the final interest groups sample in the study can be said to be relevant, 
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as the major business organizations and different stakeholders in the EED are represented, 
although there is a slight overrepresentation of interest groups from the building and 
construction industry. Many of these Euro-federations included in the sample were also the 
most active suppliers of information in terms of producing policy research and participating in 
the Commissions consultation and issuing position papers.  
 
Interest groups included in the sample are eight different peak organizations from relevant 
sectors to energy efficiency, as well as two representatives from the Coalition for Energy 
Savings, which is the formal organization of interest groups collaborated in. The sample is 
balanced on the business side by actors from the building and construction industry: FIEC 
(European Construction Industry Federation), Eurima (European Insulation Manufacturers 
Association) and EuroACE (The European Alliance of Companies for Energy Efficiency in 
Buildings), energy and supply: The Union of the Electricity Industry (Eurelectric), appliance 
manufacturers: European Engineering Industries Association (Orgalime), and general 
enterprise and industry: Confederation of European Business (Businesseurope). From the civil 
society, representatives from World Wide Fund for Nature European Policy Office (WWF-
EPO) and Climate Action Network (CAN-E) were interviewed. Four of the mentioned groups 
were members of the Coalition for Energy Savings (WWF-EPO, CAN-E, Eurima and 
EuroACE), while Businesseurope, Eurelectric, Orgalime, and FIEC were not. The divisions of 
interest groups constituencies are not entirely clear, as some of the groups have overlapping 
membership (for instance same companies inside Eurima and EuroACE). WWF-EPO is also a 
part of CAN-E, as the latter organization is a broader network for NGOs that work on climate 
issues.  
 
Attaining a representative sample of interest groups in lobbying towards the Commission was 
a challenge. Regarding sectors and important stakeholders not included in the study, many 
interest groups did not reply to inquiries or declined interviews. Among other NGOs that were 
prominent in energy efficiency under the “Green 10” umbrella, Friends of the Earth Europe 
(FoEE) did not respond to my emails, neither did the European Council for Energy Efficient 
Economy (Eceee). Other environmental NGOs were not contacted, since very few apart from 
the already mentioned were active in issuing position papers or participated in the 





 nor the organization for social housing (The European Liaison Committee for 
Social Housing - Cecodhas), replied to my emails. Other organizations such as labor interest 
and local governments were not of primary concern to the study, as their position papers 
revealed having secondary objectives compared to the energy efficiency targets and the 
overall policy design. For energy suppliers and distributors, The European Association for the 
Promotion of Cogeneration (COGEN- Europe) was not contacted, since their interest base 
(Combined Heat and Power production – CHP) constitutes a narrow part of the larger EED 
framework. Their position papers are also narrower in scope by being only concerned with 
CHP-production, and not the overarching policy framework for energy efficiency (COGEN 
Europe 2013). The position of ENTSO-E (European Network of Transmission System 
Operators for Electricity) EED considers mostly transmission of energy and is not 
preoccupied with binding energy efficiency targets or energy efficiency obligations (ENTSO-
E Position Paper). Their position paper on the ENTSO-E stated through email correspondence 
that it was not involved during the agenda-setting stage of the EED. Other interest groups in 
energy supply such as CEDEC (European Federation of Local Energy Companies) did not 
reply to inquiries. Other interest groups involved in equipment manufacture such as CECED 
(The European Committee of Domestic Equipment Manufacturer) did not participate in the 
Commissions consultation hearing was therefore not included. Among business and 
enterprise, UEAPME (European Association of Craft, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) 
were active in issuing position papers and consultations, but stated through correspondence 
not to have been active in the build-up phase of the Directive. Among other associations 
contacted within the building sector, associations such as eu.ESCO (European Association of 
Energy Service Companies) and eu.BAC (European Building Automation and Controls 
Association) did not respond to emails, while a convenient interview occasion for Polythane-
Insulation Europe (PU-Europe) could not be found. Energy intensive industries were overall 
less active in issuing position papers and participating in consultations. This might be because 
most of their relevant improvements in energy efficiency in the energy intensive industry 
have already been heavily implemented to reduce their energy costs (Euractiv 2012). Among 
those energy intensive organizations that issued position papers on the EED, neither Glass for 
Europe nor CEPI (Confederation of European Paper Industries) replied to my emails or phone 
                                                 
11
 Public consumer groups are as The European Consumer Organization (BEUC) and EUROCOOP (European 
Community of Consumer Cooperatives). One of the mentioned organizations confessed through email-
correspondence that it didn’t have the capacity to follow the policy process. 
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calls. This was unfortunate as especially Glass for Europe would be an interesting stakeholder 
due to also representing the building industry as well.  
4.4 Data Collection: the Semi-Structured Elite-
interview and Method Triangulation 
In order to answer relevant research questions, the data to do so can come from many sources 
(Yin 2009: 99). This section will outline the different approaches to how data was collected. 
This study relies mainly on interviews, with support from other secondary sources such as 
research studies, position papers and web sources.  
 
Before discussing the strengths and weaknesses of the collected data, the interview format 
best suited for the research questions should be specified. The format of the interview must be 
“tailored” depending on what type of information which is sought (Aberbach and Rochman 
2005: 673). Interviews have been described as ranging from a continuum between an open 
conversation between the interviewer and the informant, to close where a set of questions are 
predefined and cannot be amended (Bryman 2004). The semi-structured interview is 
somewhere in the middle: questions in the interview-guide are pre-defined, often with a mix 
of close and open-ended questions. The order of the questions can also be changed and 
follow-up questions may be asked (Leech 2002; Bryman 2004: 121). This form was most 
appropriate in order to undertake the interview, since much about energy efficiency politics 
and policy developments in the field was unknown to the author. Maintaining enough 
flexibility to ask follow-up questions during the interview situation was thus pivotal. 
Henceforth, by being flexible in following the interview guide and opening for the possibility 
to “probe” on questions underway, it is possible to get more exhaustive answers (Berry 2002; 
Andersen 2006). To this end, the interview guide was developed with a clear defined order of 
both closed- and open-ended questions. The motivation for balancing the fixed and open types 
of questions was to maintain both the reliability and the precision which structured interviews 
can provide, together with the in-depth knowledge and new information which the 
unstructured interview potentially offers (Leech 2002).  Although few informants were able to 
answer in substantive detail on all questions, it was nevertheless necessary to try gauging the 
informants’ responses, especially those related to contact access and contact frequency to the 
Commission. In addition, with little prior knowledge about the interest groups strategies, it 
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was necessary to be able to formulate open ended question around this policy matter. 
Moreover, the interviews can also be classified as “elite interviews” since the informants 
possess more information on the specific policy field and policy process than most other 
officials and citizens (Tansey 2007: 766). Especially for information about coalition building, 
it was necessary to contact policy brokers inside the Coalition for Energy Savings, since 
asking all the members of the group and cross-checking their answers would not be feasible 
given the time frame. Hence, those informants that functioned as “coalition brokers” were key 
informants in order to better answer the question of coalition formation, since they had been 
present through almost the whole policy development (Andersen 2006: 282). Finally, another 
important feature of the data collection process was that not all actors were identified in 
advance. To some extent, the study can be said to follow the “snowball method”, since many 
informants gave advice to whom other it would be useful to schedule an interview with 
(Bryman 2004: 333 – 334). Some of the informants were thus contacted underway in the data 
collection procedure.  
 
Also before sending out interview requests to interest groups, a document analysis of 
consultation hearings and position papers was undertaken in order to map the relevant 
stakeholders towards the EED. This was necessary to map the relevant actors, as well as 
helpful in order to determine every group’s position with regard to binding targets and the 
design of policy instruments. This was done in order to map the various interest groups 
position, but also to “scan” the interest group sample for relevant informants and whom it 
would be useful to contact. Relying on written documents published by interest groups 
besides the interviews alone, was important in order to clarify what the different stakeholders’ 
positions were. The document analysis was also coded in comparison with the Commission’s 
proposal and the final directive version to decide whom that stood out as relative losers and 
winner from the policy process. This was useful in order to prepare for the interview situation 
to establish rapport more easily by knowing their preference attainment in advance. To further 
support the interview data, other sources such as research studies by different interest groups, 
press messages and news sources were analyzed in to better understand the development of 
the policy process and intra-group linkages. When undertaking a process tracing study, it is 
recommended to employ method triangulation to ensure that the reliability and internal 
validity is as high as possible (Checkel 2007; George and Bennett 2005). This is in 
accordance with methodological recommendations, namely to cross-check the information 
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from interviews with other sources (George and Bennett 2005; Checkel 2007). However, the 
major sources of information in the early phase of the Coalition for Energy Savings are 
interviews from all the involved parties. It would however have been desirable to have the 
causal process towards coalition building verified by more sources. However, there were also 
a limited number of persons that were present through the whole coalition building process. 
Those who served as coalition brokers were therefore of particular importance.  
 
 
Prior to the data collection, the research project was notified and accepted by the Norwegian 
Social Sciences Data Services (NSD). All interest groups were first contacted by a general 
email sent to their organizations secretariat with an interview request. If no answers from the 
relevant groups were received within ten days, a personal email was sent directly to the 
relevant person in each organization with an interview request. If no reply was then received, 
interest groups were contacted directly by phone. A couple of days before each interview 
were scheduled, an outline of the questions was sent to the informants. This was useful to 
prepare them for the interview as well as help them to recall the process before the 
Commission’s proposal. Although the policy process in question was not too late back in 
time, (approximately two till three years), it is generally considered helpful to refresh the 
informants memory in advance. This can contribute to increase the reliability of the study 
(Andersen 2006). All of the respondents did approve to be named in the study (see appendix I 
for exhaustive list). Since questions regarding lobby strategies can be perceived to be 
sensitive, informants were promised not to be linked to any quote directly, including asked to 
approve the anonymous quotes used in the analysis. All of the interviews were undertaken in 
Brussels over two different time periods, apart from the interview with Businesseurope and 
the Coalition for Energy Savings Secretary General, which was carried out by phone. All the 
interviews were recorded and later accurately transcribed. Field notes were written after each 
single interview, describing and evaluating the interview situation, as well as points of special 
importance and to whom it also would be interesting to contact further.   
4.5 Reliability, Validity and Challenges Towards the 
Research Design 
The problem of reliability is a central critical aspect in employing case studies as a research 
design (Bryman 2004; George and Bennett 2005). Reliability implies that when applying the 
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same procedure, other researchers should be able to repeat the findings (Yin 2009: 45).  
Hence, the degree of reliability in the study is the ability of other researchers to reproduce the 
same result. This often meets difficulties in practice, since the interview situation can hardly 
be recreated. But, it should be possible to replicate the findings from the collected data such 
as interview transcripts. The interview guide and the classifications obtained through coding 
are therefore of importance in securing reliability. There are also other potential threats to 
reliability specific to conducting semi-structured interviews - namely, that the interviewer will 
have to frequently deviate from the interview guide (Bryman 2004). Nevertheless, this can be 
perceived as general trade-off as Leech (2002: 665) prescribes, one might attain a high 
reliability due to standardization of the interview, but low validity due to the little degree of 
securing better content through open questions. The reliability of data can generally be 
enhanced if it is supported by other sources (George and Bennett 2005).   
 
In this study, reliability was increased by transcribing every single interview and verifying the 
content with other sources such as issued research material, calendar of events, old press 
messages and general communication by the interest groups where possible. As such, cross 
checking the process of the coalition building between the informants and public sources was 
necessary. Considering internal documents from the Coalition for Energy Savings, I did ask 
for a list of landmarks from the secretariat, but was not able to retrieve them. Not getting hold 
of internal documents such as meetings agendas etc. from the early coalition building phase 
should not however be a caveat towards the reliability and validity of the study, since the 
informants who described the build-up process would generally tell the same story. The 
potential amount of information missed from not having internal documents was not crucial to 
the study, as much of the cooperation in the beginning was little institutionalized. Another 
threat to reliability was that some of the respondents from interest groups had changed jobs or 
could not remember the whole process in the desired amount of detail through all levels of 
cooperation.  
 
A threat towards the validity of the study concerns whether measured access to decision-
makers in an informal manner such as through non-institutionalized channels of lobbying 
(Gullberg 2008a: 2965). One informant underscored that since Brussels is a rather small in 
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terms of specialized interest in energy and climate politics, one would often meet people at 
informal places. Omission to ask for access through informal channels or even longer-lasting 
personal ties could thus be a problem and threaten the validity of the study.  
 
Another general problem of conducting interview is positive self-representation (Berry 2002). 
This might also be a problem since lobbyists can be susceptible to exaggerate their own 
influence (Dür2008a), for instance by claiming to have higher access than the fact. This did 
not seem the case. Another complicated factor that relates both to the reliability and the 
validity of the study, concerns the informants’ anonymity. Anonymizing the informants can 
be attractive in order to secure better responses from the informants and thereby improve the 
validity of the study by securing better responses. However, this might exacerbate the 
reliability of the study through reduced transparency. In this case, all informants approved to 
be mentioned by name (see appendix II for exhaustive list). When there are generally few 
people that were involved such as those who were central interest groups coordinators, it 
might be not purposeful to grant informants interview, as the relevant people in the energy 
efficiency domain are rather few. Hence, those who took a coordinating function could easily 
be recognized nevertheless. Since all of the informants approved disclosure, it was pivotal to 
ask them to approve citations in advance. This was helpful to solve potential 





5.1 General Access Patterns of Different Groups to 
the Commission  
The access to the Commission between the various interest groups was uneven, both in terms 
of frequency and level of access. Some informants reported to have had frequent contact with 
DG Energy (which was responsible for the legislation) almost every week before the 
proposal, including before the energy efficiency action plan. Business groups reported to have 
overall more frequent access to the Commission than environmental groups. Among the 
business sector groups, EuroACE, Eurima and Eurelectric were those main organizations who 
reported to have the highest frequency of access before the Commissions proposal. This is not 
surprising as they were the stakeholders with the most immediate material incentives in the 
legislation. Other groups reported to have had contact with the Commission around one till 
three times a month in average. Many of the informants also reported that there had been, in 
the words of one of the representatives, a “dummy-run” towards the Commission to influence 
the preceding action plan for energy efficiency. This action plan was originally expected to be 
launched before the summer recess in 2010, but was delayed due to what some informants 
believed to be the Commissions the intra-service consultation. The reasons stated was that it 
was not certain how the implications of binding energy efficiency targets and/or measures 
could affect the carbon price (ETS). Since the time between the action plan and 
Commission`s proposal was only three months, the majority of groups had been concentrating 
their advocacy efforts towards the Commission earlier on the then anticipated action plan. 
Some of the interest groups were therefore just as active to influence the action plan, which 
contained many of the measures the Commission would propose in legislation. One of the 
informants stated that “I think most of the thinking was done for the action plan and then 
translated into the Directive”. With regard to the political leadership of the Commission, the 
Cabinet was perceived by all informants to be less useful than desk officers. In the 
Commission, desk officers and policy officers were those which all of the interest groups 
considered to be most useful in having contact with. This supports earlier findings where 
interest groups are reported to be in more contact with lower level officials, than the political 
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leadership (Eising 2009: 140 – 141). Interest groups reported also to have less contact with 
senior officials such as heads of units, departments or General Secretary, than lower level 
staff that were working on the daily policy developments.  
5.2 Applying the Model for Resource Exchange  
As made account for in the theory section, interaction between interest groups and the 
Commission can be seen as an informational transaction between interdependent 
organizations (Bouwen 2002; 2004; 2009). Subsequent chapter will examine the 
Commissions need for information and the interest groups ability to supply it, to fully explain 
the provision of access goods. In section 5.3, the broader background of energy efficiency as a 
policy subsystem is described, before the expectations behind coalition formation and intra-
group dynamics will be explained.  
5.2.1 Theories of Information Demand 
The information requested by Commission from interest groups can be divided into a 
category of technical know-how and political information. Almost every group stated that the 
Commission was in demand for expert knowledge (EK). The shared view among most of the 
groups is that the Commission mainly needed expertise on the regulation of the building 
sector for energy efficiency policies. This is confirmed by other interest groups that were not 
major providers of such information. That expert knowledge was in highest demand is 
therefore as anticipated from Bouwens theory. One informant stated as following:   
“Before the proposal, the Commission was looking more for technical expertise from all 
stakeholders (…) as an umbrella organization; we are not always in the best position to 
provide very technical input”.  
 
Although some informants underlined that the level of complicatedness regarding energy 
efficiency is not so high compared to other policy areas, most of the information that was 
supplied, had the scope to demonstrate that achieving the 20 percent target (or more) for 
energy efficiency was politically feasible. The knowledge provision was mainly related to 
how the 20 percent target could be met, the design of the policy instruments designated to be 
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included and the regulation of the European building stock
12
. Being contacted directly for 
information by the Commission, can be a suitable indicator for having relevant EK. 
EuroACE, Eurima and Eurelectric were the only ones that reported to have been requested for 
information directly. In order to provide information upon request, the response time was in 
general estimated to be within three to five working days, although one would generally try to 
do so as fast as possible. The ability to provide information quick at the Commissions request 
can improve the standing of a group which thereby gives it an “insider” status. Those groups 
that were contacted directly were the major knowledge providers, although the frequency and 
level of EK output, was highest among EuroACE and Eurima. Thus having relevant 
information which the Commission needed would facilitate more frequent access for these 
groups. It is not surprising that the building sector were the central information suppliers, 
since their members have a natural competence and ownership to the policy area where 
information was needed.  
 
About the European Encompassing Interest, all groups had produced an aggregated policy 
position of their members and issued position papers about it, except for FIEC that were not 
able to agree on a strong position. The aggregated policy message of the different Euro-
federations can be seen as the EEI. However, the relevance of supplied EEI was less 
important to the Commission than EK, as the Commission could more easily find out interest 
groups position through consultation hearings and position papers. Since it should remain a 
political neutral body, the Commission would also seldom ask groups directly about their 
policy positions. Most interest groups would often refer to their position papers for their 
policy messages and what they perceived to be politically desirable. However, demonstrating 
that a political position is also feasible requires the additional provision of EK. Those groups 
who were not active research suppliers stated that they concentrated most upon general policy 
messages (EEI) and to what extent they could support the proposal, both with regard to 
binding targets and the design of policy instruments. Findings support the anticipated 
hierarchy of political information, as none of the groups reported to been requested about 
information about domestic actors. Before the launch of the EED proposal, the Commission 
                                                 
12
 One group formulated their technical expertise needed by the Commission like this: “How many buildings, 
what buildings type should we target, is it possible to regulate the European buildings sector, is it possible to 
regulate the private sector for public buildings, should the target be a number or a percentage etc.” 
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would have direct discussions with the member states, according to most of the informants. 
The political information the Commission demanded was thus EEI, which is the main access 
good European federations can provide (Bouwen 2002). Overall, Bouwen`s predictions on the 
hierarchy of demanded information (EK, EEI, DEI) are supported by the findings.    
5.2.2 Interest Groups Supply of Access Goods 
This chapter is disposed as follows: First, the general level of supply of information by the 
interest groups to the Commission will be covered. Thereafter, the information transmission 
strategies groups employed to supply the Commission will be described. Then, the overall 
production of access goods is elaborated for each interest group in the study divided along 
their sectorial affinity.   
 
As stated in chapter 3.2, interest groups ability to supply the Commission with information 
depends on their capacity to gather information through their daily “pre-advocacy” tasks: 
monitoring policy developments and strategies to produce policy relevant material (Chalmers 
2011; 2013b). Not surprisingly, those groups that had higher capacities to gather information 
through policy monitoring and producing policy research enjoyed a higher access to the 
Commission. Also, those interest groups that were involved in different networks did have a 
higher informational output. About the capacity for policy monitoring, those interest groups 
that were involved in different networks and fora did have a higher informational output. 
However, those groups that were most “networked” over the EED did so mostly to share 
information and build joint positions and less often to produce “new” policy research. 
Participating in various networks can therefore increase groups’ information production 
through better identifying what the informational demands are. About the various research 
strategies of interest groups, most would commission it to a third party such as a research 
institute or consultancies to produce relevant policy information. Those groups who could 
draw on their members’ expertise would do so, but no interest groups reported to have 
produced major research studies in-house. Those interest groups with the highest supply 
policy relevant information were especially those from the building sector
13
 (Eurima and 
EuroACE).But the interest groups abilities to produce access goods were not only related to 
                                                 
13
 See web sources in literature list for exenstive research production.    
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gather information, but also their organizational structure for aggregating a policy stance. 
Those interest groups who were faster in presenting an aggregated position, also got higher 
overall access. A slow internal decision making process can thereby hamper the effective 
provision of access goods (Bouwen 2004), and especially the provision of EEI. Those interest 
groups that were relatively quick to aggregate a joint position before the Commission 
proposal did also achieve higher access. This generally favors group that have a faster (often 
majoritarian) decision-making structure, than for instance a consensual one. Having a 
consensual structure where an aggregate position has to be agreed upon almost anonymously 
could delay the groups’ ability to supply EEI especially. This is however more critical for 
business groups than purposive groups. One nuance is also ought to be made. Not all interest 
groups were mainly preoccupied with producing information to supply the Commission as 
such. Especially environmental NGOs were active in forming a common stance with other 
business actors than producing information with the aim to lobby, particularly from the 
building sector, but also research institutes. The process of intra-group cooperation so will be 
further explained in section 5.3.    
Information transmission and lobby strategies 
Gaining access to decision makers does not only depend on the general openness of the 
channel, but also how groups employ their resources to do so (Gullberg 2011). Having special 
policy information can be one important factor as such, but there are other aspects related to 
strategies for informational transmissions. Those interest groups that had a more diversified 
approach to submit information did get higher access. Producing research material which was 
demanded, gives also an increased leverage on how to deliver the information. When 
supplying expert knowledge, this could open additional access channels besides having 
regular contact with decision-makers personally or through correspondence. Organizing 
different types of events seemed to be the preferred way to deliver information. This could for 
instance be organizing a conference or a workshop alone, or in cooperation with others 
through a campaign or coalition. As such, they had a regular access, but in order to make the 
provisions of expert information itself more effective, it could be more confined to larger 
occasions. One informant formulated it as follows:  
“I think it is really important (…) to have moments in the year where, at least one per year, 
where you can say and now here, “boom” here is the big new piece of new information that 




Those groups that had a predefined approach to producing demanded information would also 
employ such channels most frequently. Some of the informants reported that hosting a 
workshop was conceived to be the most useful approach, since it could enable a discussion 
with specialists with member of ones own group, different EU decision makers and 
sometimes national government representatives in order to discuss the policy subject in the 
same room for a day or two. One informant thus stated:    
“ (…) it could be bringing particularly key players together to the Commission, to make them 
sit together in a room etc. and we do a lot of action on that front (…). [In hosting workshops?] 
Yeah, in hosting workshops. (…). We do host workshops on the European level here in 
Brussels (…). It is a very powerful tool, and it works (…).  
 
Some nuances about the differences between “insider” and “voice” strategy is required, as 
findings in this study shows that some groups would employ both strategies to influence 
legislation. Instead of perceiving use of “voice” as a subsidiary lobby strategy secondary to an 
“insider” strategy, those groups that engaged in a campaign saw it as complimentary. It is not 
clear whether outsourcing “voice” to a coalition or a campaign can improve access to the 
Commission directly, but it shows that using an “insider” and “outsider” approach does not 
have to be mutually exclusive. Business groups would however not make “noise” on issues 
alone, but not singlehandedly; most often through campaigns or a network. However, there is 
not enough evidence in collected data to determine whether having outsider strategy would 
increase access to the Commission itself, apart from the gathering of information.  
Insulation producers and building sector groups 
This section covers interest groups that are stakeholder in terms of energy efficiency in 
buildings and the construction industry, namely Eurima, EuroACE and FIEC. Eurima 
represents the interests of insulation and mineral wool producers throughout Europe. They 
have therefore an immediate material stake in increased renovation of the building stock. 
EuroACE consists of companies involved in production of equipment, distribution, and 
energy savings controls and installations. The policy objectives of Eurima and EuroACE are 
also to a high degree similar; they were both active in advancing the need for 3 percent 
renovation of the public building stock, and by advocating long term roadmaps for building 
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renovation by the member states (EuroACE 2011; Eurima 2011). For Eurima and EuroACE, 
energy efficiency obligations was of secondary importance than immediate building 
renovation, in terms of policy instruments but became more important later during the 
negotiation process of the EED. FIEC consists of national member associations in the 
construction industry and was little involved towards the Commission before the legal 
proposal, instead concentrating the resources on the implementation of the EBPD (Interview 
FIEC). This was because the scope of the EED did not correspond to the core building 
activities of members, although they were in favour of creating a market for energy savings in 
the long run. In addition, some of FIECs member federations could not agree on supporting 
the three percent rate of public building renovation as they felt this was a clear breach of 
subsidiarity, and could therefore not advocate a strong position (Interview FIEC). FIEC also 
emphasized that policy instruments to trigger building renovation have to be directed towards 
incentivising building owners to invest in energy saving measures instead of only targeting 
energy suppliers. 
 
In terms of monitoring, both Eurima and EuroACE were present and active in different fora. 
There had earlier been informal work between European associations in the energy efficiency 
domain through the Energy Efficiency Industrial Forum (EEIF
14
). EEIFs objectives are to 
make EUs targets for energy saving mandatory, secure more ambitious legislation within 
energy efficiency and to promote better support for financial mechanisms (EuroACE 2013). 
Since the cooperation started around 2008, interest groups with a stake in energy efficiency 
had already begun cooperating on the EPBD. There has also been increasing cooperation 
between different actors within the building and construction sector through a campaign 
called Renovate Europe, headed by EuroACE. The campaign was launched to promote the 
renovation of EUs building stock in order to reach its climate targets, as well as to restart the 
construction sector after the financial crisis (Renovate Europe 2013). The campaigns main 
objectives are to reduce the energy consumption by 80 percent of Europe`s building stock in 
2050, compared to the 2005 level (Renovate Europe 2013). Renovate Europe works by 
gathering and sharing information among its partners, communicated messages, as well as 
                                                 
14
 The forum was established in 2008 and members apart from Eurima and EuroAce, include European 
Committee of Domestic Equipment Manufacturers (CECED, COGEN Europe, European Copper Institute, ELC, 
Glass for Europe, PU-Europe (EuroAce).   
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hosting different events (Interview EuroACE). With participation through different fora such 
as the Coalition for Energy Savings, EEIF and Renovate Europe, it is plausible that both 
EuroACE and Eurima had a higher capacity for monitoring relevant policy developments, as 
well as gathering more information through cooperation with other partners. Both EuroACE 
and Eurima did report not to produce much of their supplied expert information in-house, but 
were instead active in cooperation with research institutes or paid consultancies. EuroACE 
contributed to study with the Buildings Performance Institute Europe (BPIE) in 2011 which 
was the first report on the energy consumption of buildings in Europe assessed on country by 
country basis
15
. Also before the EED proposal, EuroACE cooperated in producing two other 
research publications with other partners
16
. Eurima engaged early in producing policy relevant 
information by undertaking joint studies with the research institute Ecofys and independent 
consultants, as well as drawing on their members’ expertise (Interview Eurima). The broader 
policy messages of Eurima and EuroACE were confined to general position papers and 
making a common stance with other groups. Both Eurima and EuroACE were also actively 
involved in their coordination efforts within the Coalition for Energy Savings in order to 
establish joint positions.  
Environmental NGOs  
Environmental NGOs have established a tradition for working together under the “Green 10” 
umbrella (Long and Lörinczi 2009). Among the different NGOs in the “Green 10”, WWF-
EPO, is considered to be the best endowed with an approximate 13 percent of their budget 
from the EU institutions and around 41 staff (Greenwood 2011: 16). These NGOs are widely 
considered to be efficient in agenda setting on issues that has not been fully developed yet 
(Long and Lörinczi 2009: 176 – 177; Greenwood 2011: 146). CAN-E is a specialized group 
within the “Green 10” umbrella that was established in Brussels in the early 1990s (Long and 
Lörinczi 2009: 171). CAN-E functions as an overarching network where other NGOs are 
members, such as Greenpeace, Friends of the Earth-Europe (FoEE), including WWF-EPO. 
The representative from CAN-E mainly worked together with the policy officers from the 
other environmental NGOs to coordinate their advocacy efforts, as well as inside the 
                                                 
15
 The rapport by the BPIE was the first study undertaken to map the EUs building stock and presented forecasts 
for the energy saving potential of the energy performance potential in European buildings renovation by 2050. 
16
 See section 7.2 about web literature for exhaustive list.  
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Coalition for Energy Savings. The environmental NGOs were early promoting the need for a 
binding energy efficiency target and a more ambitious regulatory framework. Especially 
WWF-EPO advanced the need of ambitious legislation in suggesting to make a connection 
between energy efficiency obligations and deep renovation of buildings (Interview WWF-
EPO; WWF-EPO 2013). Also, a major part of WWF-EPOs advocacy efforts were done in 
coordination with other groups, especially alongside CAN-E and the Coalition for Energy 
Savings (Interview WWF-EPO; CAN-E). Both NGOs reported to produce little expert 
information within their organization, whereas WWF-EPO would rely on WWF national 
offices for specific information (Interview WWF-EPO), CAN-E concentrated on the joint 
advocacy and coordination. WWF-EPO and CAN-E had also less contact with the 
Commission compared to other business organizations. Most of the efforts to enhance their 
positions where done in collaboration with others. The types of information issued from 
WWF-EPO and CAN-E were broadly confined to policy recommendations (EEI). However, 
CAN-E was active in producing research based policy information in cooperation with other 
business organizations from the building sector, where the cooperation later to became a more 
formalized as the Coalition for Energy Savings. Through participation in both a homogenous 
network (“Green 10”) and heterogeneous network (Coalition for Energy Savings), they can be 
said to have a high monitoring activity to follow policy developments, but did not engage 
actively in producing policy research material independently. Also, both groups were early 
advancing the need for 20 percent binding energy efficiency targets and concomitant stronger 
legislation.  
Energy Suppliers and transmitters 
The most relevant lobby segments for energy supply and transmission in energy efficiency are 
Eurelectric (the Union of the Electricity Industry), ENTSO-E (European Network of 
Transmission System Operators for Electricity) and COGEN Europe (The European 
Association for the Promotion of Cogeneration). Eurelectric represents the national 
associations of European utility companies, but has also direct company membership. Since 
the members of Eurelectric work directly in the market where energy efficiency obligations 
have to performed, they should be expected to possess expert information on the design of 
this policy instrument. Eurlectric dissented with the Commissions proposal both with the 
regard to binding energy efficiency targets and obligations. Reasons stated for disagreeing on 
the energy efficiency obligations is due to making energy suppliers responsible for their 
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customers’ savings without any legislation on the consumers themselves (Interview 
Eurelectric; Eurlectric 2011). Eurlectric also dissented on how the binding targets are 
expressed, as measuring the energy savings in Mtoe necessarily lead to a problematic 
calculation of fuel conversion when energy savings are to be counted. For Eurlectric, the 
lobbying process towards the Commission over the EED was the most complex one in recent 
years, although contact with the Commission was reported to be fairly frequent (Interview 
Eurelectric).  The differences between Eurlectrics preferences and the Commission proposal 
can be seen over the role of EEOs in contrast with increased flexibility over the policy design 
and stronger regulation directed towards the energy consumers (Eurelectric 2011). Eurelectric 
does not tend to join coalition, but work in alignment with other interest groups to share 
information. Regarding information provision, Eurelectric would usually concentrate on the 
broader policy recommendations while deploying the technical competencies of their 
members (Interview Eurelectric). Regarding information transmission, Eurelectric hosted one 
workshop on the energy efficiency obligations scheme after the Commission proposal later in 
March 2012.  
Enterprise, manufacturers and other industries 
The business, enterprise and industry sector in this study is mainly represented by the two 
peak organizations Businesseurope (Confederation of European Business) and Orgalime 
(European Engineering Industries Association). Businesseurope is the main body of European 
industrial and employers’ organization and has mainly national federations as members. 
Businesseurope`s position paper and consultation hearings are ambiguous towards energy 
efficiency targets and instruments. Businesseurope dissented with the Commission on the 
need for having an absolute target on energy efficiency consumption (interview 
Businesseurope). Also for Businesseurope, the main concern is that the target of energy 
savings should not be expressed in absoulute terms, while more flexibility provisions such as 
early action counting in the energy efficiency obligations would be better (Businesseurope 
2011). Businesseurope was also not convinced about the necessity to have strong legislation 
on energy efficiency, as businesses can attain savings themselves without binding legislation. 
Normally, Businesseurope based their discussions towards a position mainly on experts from 
member federations and companies. Businesseurope did not coordinated their action formally 
with other groups on the EED, but has had dialogue with other stakeholders, both those who 
agreed and disagreed on their stance. Businesseurope did not engage in independent policy 
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research to supply the Commission with information, but sometimes draw in their members’ 
expertise (Interview Businesseurope). Usually, Businesseurope would instead concentrate on 
the broader policy messages of their members (EEI).  
 
For stakeholders among product manufacturers Orgalime consists mainly of national 
associations in the mechanical, electronic and metalworking sectors of European countries, as 
well as smaller Euro-federations. As a stakeholder within energy efficiency, Orgalime is a 
technology provider in producing equipment and appliances from energy efficiency light 
bulbs to dishwashers. Orgalime was also in favor of binding 20 percent energy efficiency 
target and concomitant legislation. Orgalime works by consensus where members are 
included in working groups to aggregate a position. Orgalimes information production was 
generally focused on policy messages rather than on technical information. However, since 
their main advocacy efforts were done towards the key actors in the EP (Interview Orgalime), 
and their position papers were published fairly late, that the process of aggregating a joint 
position seems to have been slow and prolonged. Orgalime tends to remain with coordinating 
a position internally instead of joining networks or other fora due to its very encompassing 
member base (Interview Orgalime). It policy research is this normally confined the 
concentrated policy messages of their sector (EEI).  
5.3 Coalition Formation 
This chapter is disposed according to the following outline: First, the process behind the 
formation of the Coalition for Energy Savings will be traced. Then different theoretical 
explanations for coalition building between the European associations will be set forth. In 
section 5.3.2, some remarks are made about what facilitates intra-group cohesion. Finally, the 
type of collective action from the Coalition for Energy Savings will be attempted described 
and compared to other coalition models. Finally, attention will be given to what extent the 
coalition constitutes an independent entity, and especially discussed what has been called 
mobilizing a “constituency of support” in the EU context of coalitions and networks 




5.3.1 Interest Group Interaction and Coalition Building 
After the adoption of the European Performance of Buildings Directive recast in 2010, it was 
widely anticipated among interest groups that one Directive addressing energy efficiency in 
the existing building stock was forthcoming. As stated in section 5.1, the Commission`s 
action plan for energy efficiency was awaited before the summer recess 2010, but was 
postponed till March 2011 due to the Commissions inter-service consultation. This is also 
within the time interval where the groups undertook most of their formative coalitional work. 
There had been limited advocacy and attention given to the field of energy efficiency by 
environmental groups on energy efficiency up till the years 2009 – 2010, apart from on the 
review on the EPBD (Interview CAN-E). In the years 2009 and 2010, discussion started 
among environmental NGOs and with other Euro-federation on a regular basis how energy 
efficiency at the EU level should be promoted further. WWF-EPO and other NGOs had 
already started working together on the recast of the Eco-Design Directive in 2009 by calling 
for increased energy efficiency performance of appliances through a campaign called 
“Coolproducts” (Interview Matthieu Ballu). One of the campaign`s main targets was to try 
pushing the Commission for a stronger regulatory framework for energy efficiency in 
appliances (Coolproducts 2013). The status of energy efficiency and especially the need for 
binding energy efficiency targets was then further taken up by environmental NGOs and the 
think-thank European Climate Foundation (ECF) when the Commission was preparing the 
energy efficiency action plan for the EED. The cooperation between NGOs on the Eco-
Design Directive led to further joint activity with a published a manifesto on energy 
efficiency in buildings, including a call for making the target of 20 percent energy efficiency 
target in the EU binding (Interview Matthieu Ballu; EPE 2010). The increased cooperation 
between interest groups which shared an environmental concern started seeking out partners 
for cooperation on energy efficiency with the building industry and producers of domestic 
appliances (Interview Matthieu Ballu). This was also verified by informants from other 
interest groups that were not actively engaged in the status of energy efficiency at that time. 
One stated as following: “And suddenly, what happened 2010, all these actors came on to the 
scene”.  
 
Beginning in the year 2009, environmental NGOs such as CAN-E and WWF-EPO started to 
work with ECF and private consultants on how the 20 percent energy efficiency target could 
be delivered.  Different actors from environmental groups, think-tanks, research institutes, the 
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building sector and private consultancies cooperated in producing a study called “Energy 
Savings 2020” which was published the summer 2010 (ECOFYS 2010). The study mapped 
out how EUs energy efficiency policy could be designed in order to meet the 2020 target. The 
study was also an answer to the need for information about how energy savings could be 
attained and was well-referred to by the Commission in the action plan for energy savings 
(Interview CAN-E). The different interest groups involved in the “Energy Savings 2020” 
study had together identified a common concern in regulation being needed and increased 
legislation to promote investments in energy efficiency (Interview Coalition for Energy 
Savings). During this formative stage, the Coalition was promoting to make the 20 percent 
energy efficiency target legally binding by 2020 (Interview Coalition for Energy Savings). 
This was already ongoing when the Commission’s action plan for energy efficiency was 
developed, which later became the core work of the organization on the proposal for the 
Energy Efficiency Directive. The non-institutionalized cooperation between different actors 
over the research project “Energy Savings 2020” in 2010, led to further cooperation among 
the various associations in the steering group of the study. This cooperation was first a joint 
advocacy group (Interview Matthieu Ballu), from which the Coalition for Energy Savings 
sprung out from later
17
. An informal structure was established first whereby different 
members of the involved interest groups took on a function of acting as a secretariat and 
organized regular meetings (Interview Matthieu Ballu). From the initial advocacy group after 
the “Energy Savings 2020” study, a steering committee was later established to coordinate 
activities (Interview Matthieu Ballu).  
 
The starting point for cooperation on the EED was a revision of the existing Energy Service 
Directive and building further measures to draft a shadow Directive to supply the 
Commission with (Interview Matthieu Ballu). The most relevant parts of the ESD were thus 
kept which the EED was further built on in order to draft a shadow Directive, with an early 
emphasis on how the binding 20 percent energy efficiency target could be delivered. That 
relates to what levels, format and monitoring mechanisms of the whole energy efficiency 
policy design (Interview Matthieu Ballu). Concerning policy instruments in the EED, the 
energy efficiency obligations were given main attention when the shadow Directive to the 
                                                 
17
 The founding organizations of the coalition were: Buildings Performance Institute Europe (BPIE), CAN-
Europe, Cecodhas, ClientEarth, Cogen Europe, European Copper Institute, Eceee, the EU Corporate Leaders’ 
Group on Climate Change, Eurima, EuroACE, ECF, CECED, European Environmental Bureau (EEB), Glass for 
Europe, PU Europe, The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS), The Architects' Council of Europe 
(ACE), The Climate Group, WWF-EPO (Euractiv 2010).  
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EED was drafted. The environmental NGOs were particularly concerned with the promotion 
of this instrument. Since the energy efficiency end-use was primarily addressed in Energy 
Service Directive from 2006, developing these policy instruments for utility end-use schemes 
became the second priority for the NGOs, after the general promotion of 20 percent energy 
efficiency targets.  
 
Among the informants, earlier cooperation among the actors within both NGOs and the 
business side in their own networks was helpful to coordinate advocacy efforts and build 
positions. Groups within these networks would often synchronize their political positions to 
make sure that they were not contradicting each other. Among the NGOs, a longer tradition 
for cooperation under the CAN and “Green 10” umbrella had been established. The NGOs 
and think-tanks such as European Climate Foundation were primarily concerned with energy 
efficiency lagging behind the other domains in the energy and climate package, and 
renewable energy production in particular, where most of the technology providers have their 
own separate associations. Especially environmental NGOs identified the need for energy 
efficiency to have its own interest constituency, as there was comparatively little “push” for 
energy efficiency than in the renewable energy sector (WWF-EPO). Among interest groups 
from the business sector, it was important for the stakeholders with a material benefit in the 
EED to see that this window of opportunity was not missed (Interview Matthieu Ballu). Also 
European associations from industry and the building sector had been working together in the 
EEIF to make sure that the industry positions were coordinated and not contradicting each 
other (Interview EuroACE). The establishment of the EEIF in 2008 can perhaps be seen as the 
first step towards position building by the business actors from the building and industry side, 
as almost all of the European associations in this forum were foundational members of the 
Coalition for Energy Savings.  
 
As cooperation evolved, involved association started developing the advocacy group into a 
more formal coalition with a secretariat to coordinate activities (Interview WWF-EPO). 
Building a cross-sectorial platform was deemed necessary due to scattered stakeholders 
within the energy efficiency domain (Interview Coalition for Energy Savings). A joint 
position was established with a concomitant position paper, setting forth the necessary policy 
instruments in order to meet the 20 percent target (CAN-E). As such, the Coalition for Energy 
Savings became the only organization at the EU level that could present an opinion on all the 
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different instruments within the EED. The coalition was then later formalized in autumn 
2011, although a high degree of informal cooperation and joint position making had begun 
earlier in 2010 (Interview Matthieu Ballu). Membership was also reserved only to European 
associations and no individual companies, and whereas new members had to be approved by 
the steering committee of the Coalition (Interview Matthieu Ballu). Entry to the Coalition also 
required a certain membership fee to pay for the organizational structure. From there, the 
Coalition for Energy Savings was formally adopted with the appointment of a private 
consultant as a general secretary and a secretariat with staff in September 2011 (Coalition for 
Energy Savings 2011b). As the structures became solidified underway, it was decided to 
establish a structure managed by a steering committee of twelve persons, with shared seats of 
representatives from industry, public interest groups and interest groups representing a 
profession (Interview Matthieu Ballu). Entrance of new members was also subject to approval 
by this committee. Under the steering committee, there are two separate sub-committees for 
advocacy and communication (Coalition for Energy Savings 2013). Most intra-group contact 
was reported to happen in these sub-committees with meetings around every other week. 
Although the important political decisions were taken by the steering committee, the 
membership between these and the sub-committees were overlapping and much of the 
advocacy effort took place in the committee for advocacy (Interview Matthieu Ballu).  
Explanations for coalition building among European interest groups 
The general characteristics of the member base show that the Coalition for Energy Savings 
contained mostly organizations with narrow interest domains and a high degree of 
specializations during the formative phase. Except for BPIE (research institute), RICS and 
ACE (professions group), Cecodhas is the only organization with national federations as 
member associations. There is also a high prominence of NGOs and stakeholders from the 
building industry within the Coalition. Contrasted with Mahoney`s findings where Euro-
federations with an encompassing membership base was stated as a major reason for them not 
joining coalitions (2007a; 2008), the study show that those interest groups which had 
narrower membership bases and belongs to a clear defined “niche”, were in majority of the 
founding organizations of the Coalition for Energy Savings. Also by being smaller and 
perhaps having less of a grand “reputation” to defend, groups that have less need for self-
differentiation could also be more inclined to enter a coalition (Mahoney 2007a; Mahoney 
2008; Hula 1999: 95 – 97). Organizational resources do not appear to be an important factor 
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for groups to join a coalition. This is in line with Mahoney (2008), where evidence supports 
that organizations that are less endowed, are not more prone to join coalitions. This could be 
because coalitions also require resources from interest groups in terms of membership fee and 
available staff (Mahoney 2008). Since membership in the Coalition for Energy Savings was 
regulated according to a membership fee, this could indicate that the groups who joined are 
not among the least bestowed groups at the EU level. This section will set out the role of 
previous coalition behavior and cooperation in order to explain coalition building, as well as 
present the theoretical expectations pertaining to the issue context of the policy field.   
 
Joining a coalition at an early stage is perceived to be of central importance to interest groups, 
since it can easier identify which other groups that are their potential partners and opponents 
(Hula 1999: 51, 93). Before an interest group can mobilize, it is useful to have information 
about which actors in the policy space they can cooperate with. Interest groups that have 
already established linkages to other groups through informal networks should therefore more 
easily be able to map out potential collaborators. Perhaps more importantly, interest groups 
that are familiar with position building with other groups should be expected to join a 
coalition. The previous behavior by most of the groups seems to be central in order to set up 
the coalition. Environmental NGOs have for a long time been cooperating under the “Green 
10” umbrella, whereas actors from the business side with a stake in energy efficiency had 
previously worked in alignment, both in the EEIF and the Renovate Europe campaign. These 
are however examples of homogenous network (where the member base is similar) and not a 
heterogeneous
18
 network like the Coalition for Energy Savings. Nevertheless, the evidence 
from this study is in accordance with earlier research that show those organizations who have 
previous experience with coalitions, are more prone to join one (Hojnacki 1997; Hula 1999). 
It thus seems plausible that forging a larger coalition was easier between two different 
networks that were already well connected. In order for the Coalition for Energy Savings to 
develop, it could be in Hulas (1999: 109) words that: “coalitions come from those who are 
closest to themselves”. Many of the groups were already “acquaint” in their own interest 
domain: for the business organization, both the EEIF and Renovate Europe had been in place 
to facilitate cooperation, and the NGOs have a longer tradition for working together under the 
“Green 10” umbrella. However, one point requires further elaboration, which is how interest 
                                                 
18
 Chalmers (2013b) refers to such networks as “homophilic” and “heterophilic”.  
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groups from two different homogenous networks (such as “Green 10” and the EEIF) decided 
to collaborate together. 
 
Networking could very well be the “habitual” way of working by environmental NGOs, 
which Warleighs (2000) findings indicate. Purposive groups are perceived to be effective in 
identifying and cooperating with other actors in order to advocate their stance (Warleigh 
2000). As this case shows, the role of environmental NGOs was central to lift the status of 
energy efficiency and promote cooperation. The agenda-setting function of environmental 
NGOs is also relevant for the energy efficiency domain, where the NGOs often act as policy 
first movers (Long and Lörinczi 2009). Also, environmental NGOs would rather concentrate 
on advocacy efforts and seek out cooperation with partners to enhance their message 
(Warleigh 2000), than producing policy relevant information themselves. This can however 
also be reciprocal as corporate interest can seek out member-based organizations to advance 
their policy claims (Hojnacki 1997: 70). Informants involved in producing the joint report 
“Energy Savings 2020” would underscore how the earlier successful cooperation between 
different actors developed further into more formal channels. Organizational characteristics 
thus seems to be central in order to explain coalition building, first by groups in their own 
environment, and then by seeking out other interest groups with shared concern from another 
policy area. With regard to this, the early trust building part was deemed central, as many of 
the interest groups related to the building industry were perceived by some of the purposive 
groups as not having a primary environmental concern. One of the informants expressed the 
development of the relationship as follows:   
 “(…) the role of the individuals here in Brussels, the trust building is essential (…). The 
establishment of trust, knowing that the NGOs are not tree hugger lunatics, and the industry 
guys are not raving polluters, really played a role in discussions”.  
 
Organizational causes are however unsatisfactory to explain coalition formation alone. As 
stated in the theory section, earlier evidence on coalition building expects that when the 
policy content is complicated and actors’ competencies are spread across the subsystem, 
cooperation emerges. This is what is believed to have happened in the context of American 
interest groups; increasing policy specialization can motivate interest groups to pursue 
coalition strategies (Hula 1999: 26, 123). This seems to be supported in the case of building 
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the Coalition for Energy Savings, since most of the participants are stakeholders across 
different parts of the energy efficiency domain. Also, the perceived opposition to energy 
efficiency was by some of the informants seen as prominent, and especially from the Council. 
The coalition was developed in a context of status quo orientation by leading member states 
with regard to energy efficiency, as a strong framework would require clear sources of 
financing for renovation. Some of the informants did also perceive the relative opposition to 
energy efficiency by other interest groups also to be pronounced, whereas some informants 
were convinced that especially Eurelectric and its member federations were lobbying the 
national governments hard to weaken the legislation, as well as Businesseurope. As such, 
there was a strong bias for the status quo to prevail. This is in line with Mahoney’s findings 
(2008) where coalitions are more likely to emerge when the constellations of adversaries are 
apparent.  About the policy context in which the interest groups operated in, one of the 
informants stated:  
 “(…) everybody likes it and everybody is for it [energy efficiency], and then it comes to real 
action, suddenly and partially due to the sovereign debt crisis which came just in then, the 
response was `yeah, we would like do to it, but unfortunately we have no money` (…)”.  
 
As this quote indicate, especially sources of finance are central to energy efficiency 
investments. This is one of the most difficult topics to solve as in order to solve the market 
failure of energy efficiency, high up-front costs are needed. The technical nature of energy 
efficiency and the scattered competence on important topics such as finance lead to the 
necessity of cooperation. However, policy details like discussing how to deliver energy 
savings was important, but in order to establish the coalition, determining the goal was also 
central. The goal of the Coalition was to promote 20 percent binding energy efficiency targets 
and membership was regulated thereafter. Interest groups could therefore coalesce around a 
target which matched their individual preferences. Admittance to the Coalition was regulated 
according to binding 20 percent targets and thereby also a marker of ambition to which 
groups could sign up to (Interview CAN-E), and agree on not to oppose the work of the 
Coalition for Energy Savings in independent advocacy efforts (Interview Matthieu Ballu). 
The promotion of binding energy efficiency targets as a unifying goal fits with the theory and 
evidence from Hula (1999: 30 – 32). It shows also that it is easier to build a common 
advocacy position when the current status quo opposition is strong and those interest groups 
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that opposite can take a proactive stance. According to one informant, facilitating agreement 
on energy efficiency in the formative phase was not difficult because: 
 “Europe was doing so badly on energy efficiency that everybody in industry just wanted 
more of it to happen, and they were more than happy to sign up to a binding target, because 
it’s the sort of thing that would make the difference”. 
5.3.2 Intra-Group Coherence  
As stated in theory, for a coalition to function a formal structure is needed to overcome the 
initial problem of transaction costs and facilitate information sharing. A formal decision 
making structure with a policy brokers, as well as the facilitation of benefits should give 
interest groups incentives to remain inside. During the pre-legislative stage of the EED, the 
Coalition for Energy Savings largely worked as an ad-hoc coalition before becoming 
established in autumn 2011. Facilitating agreement inside this advocacy group that could 
resemble the features of an ad-hoc coalition was reported rather unproblematic. Within this 
informal advocacy group there was also a secretariat that would monitor policy developments, 
facilitate information exchange, prepare communication work and outreach to decision-
makers. Another shared feature of the ad-hoc coalition is thought to be with like-minded 
interest groups (Mahoney 2008: 167). The Coalition for Energy Savings display features as 
such where some of the members had complimentary objectives in the short term, but more 
uncertain long terms interests. For instance, is the promotion of CHP technology which is a 
technology to accommodate fossil fuel represented by COGEN Europe, is inconsistent with 
the long term targets of the environmental NGOs to reduce climate gas emissions. Other 
member organizations have also been reported to have been adversaries on other policy issues 
such as the ETS, as well as one the role of energy efficiency in domestic appliances. This 
indicates that the shared ground for cooperation is similar concerns over the status of energy 
efficiency. The 20 percent target was therefore the appeal to join the Coalition, which did 
most on the work of general advocacy and communication about the need for 20 percent 
binding targets. Interest groups could therefore also lobby independently on the topics that 
were most salient to them as the members did their own advocate efforts individually, but it 
didn’t contradict the joint position. The less formalized stance of the Coalition for Energy 
Savings contributed to that, as uniting on the common needs for binding energy efficiency 
targets was not difficult compared to later. This is in accordance with Hulas observations 
(1999: 30 – 32).  
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 “(…) when it comes to the proposition of the EED, in some ways it came to relatively easy, it 
wasn’t too hard to get agreement (...). What has actually been more challenging getting an 
agreement, has been now the sort of attention to implementation of the EED, but also to the 
question of targets for 2030”. 
 
However building trust was deemed to be essential for the cooperation to work further. All 
informants reported to have done a high level off efforts inside the coalition to make sure that 
their position was reflected. Since meetings where done fairly regularly from once or twice a 
week (Interview Matthieu Ballu; Interview WWF-EPO), it can indicate that cohesion was 
high. All involved groups reported to have done a high share of efforts inside the Coalition for 
Energy Savings in the beginning phase, from 2010 till the formal establishment of the 
Coalition in autumn 2011. Although cooperation started in 2009 with producing the “Energy 
Savings 2020” report, little policy research was undertaken after that. Instead informants 
would underline the high degree of information sharing. Such information sharing could 
improve the groups’ ability to better monitor policy developments. According to one 
informant, the information that everyone could bring to the Coalition also made it more 
attractive to cooperate:   
 “So they met regularly, every other week there with all issues, political issues, prepare the 
communication work. Exchange of information, rumors, leaked documents etc. It was an 
extremely open discussion there, completely informal”.  
 
Establishing a structure that enables provision of selective benefits such as information 
exchange, prepare communication and coordinate efforts can thus contribute to intra-group 
coherence.  
5.3.3 The Coalition for Energy Savings – What Kind of Actor?  
In the context of coalition formation within the EU, the Coalition for Energy Savings seems to 
be an unusual type of organization, from starting as an ad-hoc coalition to evolve as 
something more formalized. This section will attempt to explore what kind of collective 
action the Coalition for Energy Savings constitutes. Different types of more developed 
coalition models will be contrasted and seen in the light of previous discussions about interest 
groups mobilization. Finally, the role of Coalition for Energy savings will be discussed 




Even though the work inside the Coalition for Energy Savings displays other similar features 
of ad-hoc coalitions, it nevertheless violates definition of ad-hoc coalition due to the formal 
organizational structure and regulated membership as cooperation evolved (Heclo 1978; Hula 
1999; Mahoney 2008: 168). Another feature of ad-hoc coalitions is that the members are 
expected to mobilize for only on single issue (Mahoney 2007a: 377), and one could thereby 
expect them to dissolve when the issue is over. An ad-hoc coalition could still be working on 
a topic for the medium term (as the Directive has turned to the implementation phase), but 
overall the Coalition has become more elaborated with new members having joined underway 
(Interview Coalition for Energy Savings). The stability of the coalition is therefore striking, in 
a period where policy networks and alliances in Europe are thought to be “less stable and 
more issue specific” (Richardson 2000: 1008). Other models of interest groups coalitional 
behavior does not fully describe the cooperation in this case either. Warleigh (2000: 239 – 
240) set forts a policy coalition model for cooperation between interest groups based on 
mutual interests over a policy issue, although the different features are not presented in-depth. 
This approach can be more fertile as it does not make assumptions about an organization 
structure for a coalition to form. Instead, motivation to form coalition is done by a “pragmatic 
search for advantage” (Warleigh 2000: 240). Warleigh contrasts this with the more developed 
Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) by Sabatier, which refers to stable networks of 
advocates who perceive the policy issue similarly, grounded in common values and beliefs 
(Sabatier 1998; Sabatier and Weible 2007). It follows from the assumptions about interest 
groups’ behavior, that a coalition not based on common beliefs cannot be labeled an advocacy 
coalition per se (Szarka 2010: 839). The ACF is hardly feasible to test in this case due to the 
large number of informants such a theory demands, as well as it takes the whole policy 
subsystem as the unit of analysis with a scope of long term policy change (Sabatier 1998; 
Sabatier and Weible 2007: 220). Giving primacy to policy beliefs over policy interests might 
be overblown when studying under which conditions a coalition has been established, as 
Warleigh (2000: 238) notes: “there is no need for a common Weltanschauung, just 
complementary objectives”. Hence, the reason for joining a coalition is thought to be 




But Warleighs model of policy coalition (2000: 240) does omit one important aspect of the 
Coalition for Energy Savings, which is the horizontal form of integration (i.e. flat and non-
hierarchical relationships) between the interest groups (Pijneburg 1998: 305 – 306). The 
Euro-federation model is an example of a type of horizontal integration as it is established 
like an overarching type of umbrella organization (Pijneburg 1998: 305). The description of 
the Coalition for Energy Savings as set forth in the study could therefore display features of a 
Euro-federation as such. The consensual way of decision making inside the Coalition for 
Energy Savings makes the aggregation of a policy position resemble what Bouwen labels EEI 
(2002). Disputes could therefore be more easily solved when there was a shared committee to 
oversee the advocacy process and being under the organization of a policy broker when there 
was disagreement. It is therefore probable that the Coalition for Energy Savings transformed 
form an ad-hoc coalition till becoming a Euro-federation later. In that respect, one of the 
informants stated:  
 “I think it must have been in September 2011 when the Coalition really started working as a 
European association, although it didn’t have the legal status as a European association.”  
 
However, one nuance ought to be made considering the comparison with the Euro-federation 
model, as there is an underlying logic of collective action. Hula conceives that coalition 
formation between organizations to some extent represent the collective action between firms 
or individuals, although there are important differences as interest groups are already 
mobilized organizations (1999: 23 – 25). For interest groups that join a coalition, having the 
possibility to shape the policy is connected with membership to coalition formation. The 
decision to join a coalition can also be motivated with what can be seen as negative incentives 
for firms to join Euro-federation, namely that European decision-makers will not take will 
take the view of the relevant coalition as the view for the interest groups sector as a whole 
(McLaughlin and Jordan 1993: 155; Richardson 1996: 204).However, this point should not be 
exaggerated as Euro-federations often represents as sector in their own. According to Hula 
(1999: 26 – 30), another motivational factors behind an interest group decision to join a 
coalition is due to the institutional background in which the interest group operate. This 
institutional background for the interest groups to mobilize at the EU level will be presented 
in the next chapter.  
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A coalition as a broader constituency of support?  
As outlined above, the working mode of the Coalition for Energy Savings could resemble the 
structure of a Euro-federation, with a flat and consensual decision making procedure. As 
stated in the causes for establishing the coalition, there was comparatively little “push” for 
energy efficiency by interest groups compared to for instance renewables. When 
competencies are dispersed and stakeholders are scattered, establishing a cross-sectorial 
platform can be an appropriate medium to develop such support. Since the Coalition was also 
the only organization that was able to present a position on all the different aspects of the 
EED (Interview Matthieu Ballu), it also eases the burden for decision makers when 
considering whether they have enough support for a proposal. Interest groups that can present 
provide information and support, becoming what has been called a “one-stop shop”, is 
deemed to be favorable when dealing with the Commission. Earlier case studies have 
recognized that due to the high need for information and scarce resources by officials, the 
Commission prefers not to encounter interests that are divided or contradictory (Knill 2001: 
240). Also in the American context, coalitions are understood to be effective as an interest 
group strategy, by helping legislators to avoid having to take difficult decisions (Hula 1999: 
28). For decision makers that have to confront disunited interests, this also entails making 
difficult choices when compromises are not agreed upon in advance. Interest groups can 
therefore be encouraged to agree on a position joint first. It has also been acknowledged that 
legislators have an interest in establishing long term relationships with different interest 
groups (Loomis 2002: 188; Gullberg 2008b:162).  
 
Cooperation between interest groups to form a larger platform was reported to have been 
desirable between several proponents of the EP and the Commission side (Interview Coalition 
for Energy Savings). From this aspect, the Coalition is also a response to the needs of policy 
making in the European Union, to have an overarching and comprehensive voice for energy 
efficiency cross-sectorally (Interview Coalition for Energy Savings). This parallels earlier 
debates about the interest groups relationship with decision makers, where a supranational 
actor such as the Commission can play a strategic role by mobilizing what has been called “a 
constituency of support” (Richardson 1996: 204; Burns and Carson 2011: 146). It has been 
recognized that every DG in the Commission prefers to have actors that can support its 
proposals and display where the “bulk of support lies” on a given issue (Chalmers 2013b: 15 
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– 16; Mahoney 2007a: 368). Also, the work within the Coalition for Energy Savings was 
significant in that sense that it provided the Commission with the relevant policy information 
it needed and the legitimacy from both business actors and member based organizations. In 
terms of provided information from the Coalition for Energy Savings, the Coalition did also 
met with Commission frequently and exchanged information often (Interview Matthieu 
Ballu). Also, since members of the Coalition for Energy Savings would usually present 
themselves as members of the Coalition, the aggregated contact of the Coalition for Energy 
Savings to the Commission was high (Interview Matthieu Ballu). Deepened cooperation 
between the Commission with market actors and civil society can thus be used to “reinforce” 
the Commissions position versus the Council and member states (Coen 1997: 104). This is 
underscored in earlier studies between the Commission and other networks of interest groups, 
where a cross-sectoral platform can provide more “clout” in policy making (Eikeland 2011).  
 
The long term scope of power relations between European institutions is not the scope of this 
study, but promoting interest groups to form coalitions can be in order to achieve one of the 
Commission goals, namely increased European integration (Burns and Carson 2011: 146). 
When there is high opposition from member states on an issue, such behavior can be 
encouraged by supranational actors. As seen, in figure 3, the EU has taken a patchwork 
approach to its energy efficiency policies. This study has shown how the constellation of 
interest groups within the energy efficiency policy subsystem has changed. Such a change in 
interest groups constellation can however be necessary for the Commission to propose 
stronger measures when the progress towards the 2020 energy efficiency target is due to be 
revised in 2016 (Commission 2012). After all, energy efficiency is a relatively new policy 
domain for environmental NGOs to be brought up in a coordinated way by interest groups. 
Since the Commission is considered to be the most supranational institution in the EU and 
motivated towards advancing deeper integration and thereby enhance its own position, 
(Bouwen 2004: 346), the Coalition for Energy Savings can thus provide the needed support 
for supranational in a policy area where the member states preferences have been shown to be 
reluctant. This also has to do with the policy area of energy efficiency requiring a stable 
political framework, due to the high up-front costs and long payback rates of energy 
efficiency investments. For companies that seek to invest in energy efficiency, a steady flow 
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of projects is also needed for investments to be worthwhile (Interview EuroACE)
19
. 
Renovation of public buildings could be such an immediate trigger in order to create a market 
demand for energy efficiency projects first, in which companies would decide to invest in 
energy efficiency service delivery. Since such projects also require high up-front costs, stable 
framework conditions for energy efficiency are central for businesses that consider investing 
in building renovation. Developing long term strategies for energy efficiency seemed to be 
central for interest groups to continue their cooperation. Informants also perceived the 
cooperation within the Coalition for Energy Savings to be long term, in order to secure their 
goals with promoting longer term targets towards the 2030 goals for energy efficiency. 
5.4 Amendments in the EED Compared to the Final 
Proposal 
Some of the articles and provisions in the EED were substantially amended during the 
ensuing negotiation phase after the Commission’s proposal. The main addition was various 
opt-out clauses related to the implementation of various policy instruments. Member states 
were also given some flexibility regarding how measurements are counted. One of the most 
central opt-outs in the scheme regards the renovation of public buildings by the member 
states, which was cut to occupied building at the central government level in the final 
directive
20
 (Commission 2012). In addition, member states could opt for other policy 
measures as an alternative to establishing an EEO-framework. One exemption for the member 
states is to ensure that energy companies contribute to national energy efficiency funds that 
the state can contribute to, equaling the cost of undertaking energy efficiency installations 
(Commission 2012; EED guidebook 2013c). Also, the final directive versions open up the 
possibility for so called “early action” measures within the EEO framework, which in practice 
translates that earlier efforts taken to save energy can be counted as savings under the EED if 
they are implemented before 2014 (Commission 2012: 15 – 17). On top of this opt-out of 
early actions accounting, there is another 25 percent exemption amount which members that 
already have energy efficiency obligations in place can credit (Blogactiv 2012; Commission 
                                                 
19
 This is especially related to building companies, energy suppliers that invest in services directly and for 
ESCOs, which have to invest in training of staff in order to go in for energy efficiency projects.  
20
 This reduction is significant, as buildings occupied by the central governments constitutes a small segment of 
the whole public building stock. For instance, it hardly applies to some member countries with limited amount 
centrally possessed buildings, such as federal Germany.   
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2012: 15 – 17). Member states can also get more flexibility towards how the 1.5 percent 
quantities are phased in, through differentiation for different years (Commission 2012: 15 – 
17). Regarding the binding energy efficiency targets and Energy Supplier Obligations, the 
little political will from member states for political integration in the field of energy efficiency 
for such measures is a major reason why the framework was not stronger.   
 
Although EEO schemes were a first priority for the Coalition for Energy Savings together 
with promoting the 20 percent binding target, there was also one important article added to 
the directive, which according to the informants were due to their intensive lobbying efforts 
towards the EP. This concerns article 4 especially (that changed from article 3a in the 
Commission proposal), which enforces member states to draw up long term renovation road 
maps for the energy efficiency performance of the building stock and roadmaps for 
implementing these policies. This article is also the only measure in the EED that has a time 
horizon beyond the year 2020 (Interview EuroACE). This entails that member states have to 
draw up strategies for the renovation of the existing building stock which will be revised 
every three year (Commission 2012; EED Guidebook 2013b). This was satisfying for those 
interest groups with a material interest from the building sector. It is also a necessary 
approach since energy efficiency installations are demanding in terms of investments and staff 
training and therefore requires a long term strategy to attain upgrades (Commission 2011a: 7).  
5.5 Summary of Findings  
The study has put forth two theories. The first model of resource exchange of information 
between the Commission and interest groups seem to capture the relationship between 
decision makers and lobbyists in a satisfactory manner. The Commission was by all interest 
groups perceived to need mainly technical information, and EEI over DEI again. Most of the 
technical information supplied to the Commission also took the form of being what Chalmers 
(2013a) calls feasibility information, namely to demonstrated how the 20 percent energy 
efficiency target could be met. Providing technical information would give an interest group 
increased access to the Commission. Interest groups from the building sector were the central 
knowledge providers in this regard, in cooperation with different research institutes. For 
interest groups it was important to anticipate what information that would be needed. Those 
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interest groups that that could gather technical information from members and through other 
networks achieved higher access to the Commission. For those actors the EED was most 
salient for, interest groups from the building sector preferred to cooperate with research 
institutes and consultants to produce information, while Eurelectric would mainly draw on 
their members’ expertise. Environmental NGOs would not concentrate on supplying 
information to the Commission directly, but work along other actors to coordinate policy 
communication. Also, interest groups with a clearer profile for information production could 
also achieve a higher repertory to provide the information to decision makers. Organizing 
conferences or workshops seems to be a preferred option, and would thereby open another 
access channel to the Commission. Also, for interest groups that possessed technical 
information or relevant expertise also made it more probable that the Commission will contact 
an interest group for information directly. Those interest groups that possessed technical 
information could also increase their leverage on how to supply it. The benefits of being a 
knowledge provider are thus multiple, compared to the supply of access goods by 
organizations that would mainly concentrate on policy messages. Also groups with members 
directly in touch with the building market (EuroAce, Eurima) did to a high degree coordinate 
their advocacy activity together with other organized interests participated in “outside” 
strategies such as the Renovate Europe campaign.  This shows that being an “insider” does 
not necessarily exclude a group from using an outside tactic. Together, this adds up that EK is 
the key resource to the Commission when the lobby channel is overcrowded (Gullberg 2011). 
The importance of being a knowledge provider in order to gain access is further underscored 
by findings from other domains in EU climate and energy politics. Both in the case of the 
revision of the ETS and ownership unbundling of electric utilities, interest groups that could 
provide demanded information about the relevant policy design were central policy 
interlocutors to the supranational institutions (Wettestad 2009; Eikeland 2008; Eikeland 
2011). This could indicate that interests groups representing the building sector have gained a 
standing of providing reliable information about the European policy dimension (Coen 2007: 
338 – 339).  
 
Despite the low occurrence of coalitions between interest groups to emerge at the EU level 
(Mahoney 2008), findings from this study indicates that pursuing a coalition strategy might be 
a preferred way for interest groups to work, but most plausibly under certain conditions. This 
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study has shown that the main factors contributing to interest groups decision to forge a 
coalition are organizational characteristics such as earlier collaborative experience and issue 
context factors related to the policy area. The study is thus is accordance with earlier findings 
(Hojnacki 1997; Mahoney 2008), where both these factors co-vary in order to explain why 
some interest groups form coalitions. Understanding Euro-federations collaborative behavior 
in terms of linkages to other interest groups is central when they are lobbying on a contested 
issue. Especially when there the stakeholders are come from “niche” groups, are scattered in 
terms of competencies and the political content is complex, the study shows that formal 
coalition building can be a preferred strategy for interest groups. This complements Mahoney 
(2007a; 2008) findings, whereas she considers that those organizations with encompassing 
memberships are less prone to join coalitions, whereas in the case of Coalition for Energy 
Savings, most of the members belonged to a “niche” domain. 
 
Altogether, the findings in this study show that earlier criticism of the Euro-federation as for 
being “weak”, “ineffective” and a “paper tiger” (Pijneburg 1998: 303 – 305), ought to be 
nuanced. Euro-federations, when they are well networked, are very well able to close the 
information gap for decision-makers, as well as to build a formal coalition to enhance their 
policy claim. Instead of being only a single “fora” for their members (Eising 2009: 184), this 
study indicates that Euro-federations can gain considerable autonomy in terms of developing 
advocacy strategies by building positions with other groups. However, the study also shows 
that interest groups can have a high level of access, but also still have moderate impact upon 
policy proposals (Bouwen 2002: Dür and de Bievre 2007a), as the Commission’s proposal did 
not contain any prescription of binding energy efficiency targets, although most of the 
Coalition for Energy Savings members achieved their goals in terms of policy instruments.  
5.6 Evaluation of Theory and further Theoretical  
Propositions 
The approach set forth by Chalmers where interest groups capacity to meet the informational 
demand is understood as their capabilities to monitor policy developments and produce policy 
research material (2011; 2013a), seems justified. However, this study shows that most interest 
groups would usually cooperate with third parties to produce technical information, apart for 
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those few organizations that could mobilize relevant competence among their members. The 
cooperation to produce technical information mostly remained with actors that had 
established a relevant competence in the area. Being connected in a homogenous and 
heterogeneous network was an advantage for interest groups to share information, which 
could better monitor policy developments and identify needs for relevant information 
(Chalmers 2013a). This indicates that network strategies matter most to increase 
representativeness and to obtain advantages through shared information, rather than to 
technical information jointly. With regard to the Coalition for Energy Savings, this seems 
plausible, as after the joint venture of producing the “Energy Savings 2020” report, sharing 
information and position building was more relevant than producing new policy research. 
However, the Coalition for Energy Savings would supply the Commission early with 
information about how to meet the overall energy efficiency target of 20 percent, wherein the 
policy preferences of the member where aggregated. As such, a coalition can be an effective 
medium for interest groups to supply their aggregated policy recommendations as it amplifies 
the policy claim and thereby resembles EEI, but those groups concerned about supplying 
relevant policy research material would pursue such strategies independently.     
 
One nuance is however ought to be made with regard to the supply of access goods by the 
different Euro-federations. Bouwen recognizes that “a slow decision-making structure inside 
a European association can hamper the efficient provision of access goods” (Bouwen 2004: 
344). Different decision-making structures could be identified across the interest groups in the 
study.  As seen in this case, some of the larger federations with predominantly national 
associations as members (Orgalime, FIEC) were slow or not able to aggregate a strong 
position. It could be a tendency that those organizations which display features of majoritarian 
decision making structure are faster to aggregate a position, than those who display 
consensual features. A majoritarian decision making structure implies how positions are 
determined according to a certain size of the interest groups members or simply majority 
voting. A consensual decision making structure refers to almost anonymous decisions with 
only minor deviations. Klüver (2012) investigates how a different organizational 
characteristic in terms of resources, staff and member base impacts the supply of information 
from interest groups. But neither resources nor staff has in this study been shown to be the 
major determinants upon groups informational output. It might therefore be that groups that 
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have demonstrated a consensual mode of organization are slower to react to informational 
demands by European institutions. Linking Euro-federations decision making structure to the 
informational supply can thus nuance how fast interest groups are able to supply access 
goods. One of the informants expressed it as follows:   
 “More and more associations tend to have direct company membership, which means they 
got much stronger boards (…). All the associations, the more likely it is to have (…) 
unanimity or consensus. And that defines the character of what you can do”. 
 
The study has attempted to identify under which circumstances Euro-federations decide to 
form coalitions. Although Euro-federations are thought to be generally less inclined than 
American interest groups to form coalitions (Mahoney 2007a; Mahoney 2008), the causes 
behind forming the Coalition for Energy Savings seem the same as for US interest groups, 
which could indicate that lobbying at the EU level is not something sui generis (Woll 2006). 
Findings from the study seem to discern that previous collaboration behavior of interest 
groups and the nature of a policy issue matters for a coalition to emerge. Interest groups that 
are used to work in alignment are often more prone to form coalitions. Increased interest 
group cooperation could therefore be expected when relevant groups are already familiar with 
position building and embedded in a homogenous network first. This could perhaps ease the 
transition when forming a coalition, as seen in this case where both NGOs (“Green 10”) and 
building industry (EEIF) would already be accommodated to make positions that don’t 
contradict each other first. The integration of homogenous networks into a heterogeneous 
network can be such a causal mechanism (George and Bennett 2005: 111) from which the 
Coalition for Energy Savings emerged. A further theoretical development could thus be to 
first identify to which different “cluster” interest groups usually belong to first when 
discerning ad-hoc coalitions. Also, informants in this study reported that coalition behavior 
was a regular part of their advocacy efforts. One representative that was not a member of the 
Coalition for Energy Savings thus stated the following:  
 “(…) the moment you get a coalition it is much easier to talk, because you are presenting a 
pre-consensus, you are politically an easy prospect. Increasingly, there are ad-hoc coalitions 
on issues. And increasingly, you have to be several associations together.”  
 
As the quote indicates, building ad-hoc coalitions at the EU level might occur more frequently 
than expected. This could be enhanced when the policy subject is contested and the 
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competencies are scattered, such as in the energy efficiency domain, where the call for 
binding 20 percent energy efficiency target between interest groups was done cross-sectorally. 
Interest groups could thus be susceptible to form the more complex and encompassing issues 
that are brought up to the EU level. As such, it could be easier to identify in which policy 
domains coalition building is more likely to occur through mapping the relevant background 
factors and organizational characteristics in advance. In the US context, Hula considers the 
increasing coalitional behavior by interest groups to be caused increasing specialization and a 
general proliferation of the interest group population towards narrower domains (1999:6). In 
the EU context, the European interest group population grew rapidly after the Maastricht 
Treaty and establishment of the single market although it has stagnated in recent years 
(Greenwood 2011: 9 – 11). If the interest group landscape in the EU will increase and 
resemble the US interest group population, coalition building might well become a preferred 







6.1 Concluding Remarks 
The study attempts to answer two research questions. A short suggestion for further research 
is also made in the answer of research question two.  
1. What kind of “access goods” did the European associations supply to the Commission 
before the EED proposal, and what strategies did they employ to do so? 
 
As a technical and bureaucratic body, the Commission was perceived by the interest groups to 
mainly be in demand for technical information under the pre-legislative phase of the EED. 
The Euro-federations related to the building industry were early in supplying such 
information by cooperating with research institutes and consultancies. They were also the 
groups that got highest access to the Commission. This confirms earlier findings, namely that 
expert knowledge is a key resource to achieve access, when channel is overcrowded such as 
towards the Commission (Gullberg 2011). Those groups, who could not produce technical 
information to get access to the Commission, supplied political information about the policy 
interest of their members (EEI). Environmental NGOs did not approach the EED towards 
production of access goods as such, but instead largely concentrate on advocacy work with 
other actors. The strategies used by Euro-federations to supply the Commission were mostly 
insider strategies. Findings suggest that employing “insider” and “outsider” strategy 
simultaneously is not mutually exclusive, as groups can align with others, either through 
campaigns or networks, to make “voice” around an issue. Some groups would align in 
broader networks and a coalition in order to amplify their policy messages. Possessing access 
gods such as technical information also gives more leverage how to transmit it. Providing 
technical information through events such as workshops seems to be a favorable strategy for 
delivering information. However, in order to better anticipate the need for information, being 
connected in a network and coalition seems favorable for groups in order to identify what 




2. Why did some of the Euro-federations establish a coalition to promote energy 
efficiency, and how did they aggregate a joint advocacy position among them?  
 
The relative lack of “push” in the energy efficiency sector compared to for instance the 
concentrated interest bases of renewable energy producers was an important factor by 
environmental NGOs to identify the need for increasing interest group collaboration. Earlier 
successful cooperation over the research report “Energy Savings 2020” between different 
stakeholders and interest groups caused further collaboration and was developed to a larger 
cross-sectorial platform called the Coalition for Energy Savings. A mutual concern over the 
status of energy efficiency towards the 20 percent target was deemed central to the 
cooperation. The earlier habit of coordinating positions between the interest groups in their 
own networks was of importance. However, the issue context in which the interest groups 
decided to form a coalition is pivotal. Due to the scattered stakeholders and competencies 
across the energy efficiency policy domain, coalition building became an important advocacy 
strategy in order to mobilize for stronger legislation, as well as the relative opposition towards 
stronger energy efficiency legislation by other actors and member states. A cross-sectorial 
coalition that can promote European integration is also likely to be favored by a supranational 
body like the Commission, which can provide it with information and support behind 
proposals. The aggregation of a position inside the Coalition for Energy Savings largely 
resembles the way a position is aggregated in a Euro-federation, with a flat structure and a 
consensual mode of decision. Having established a more formalized structure helped to 
increase accountability by the members, as well as facilitating information sharing. Also the 
trust building underway mattered for stronger ties to develop till the Coalition for Energy 
Savings became formalized later. 
 
The problems related to describing the cooperation that occurred with the Coalition for 
Energy Savings concerns the degree of formalization and establishing membership rule. As 
seen in the process towards the formal adoption of the Coalition for Energy Savings, 
successful cooperation in an ad-hoc alliance might lead to further joint activities. Warleigh 
(2000) points out the fact that an ad-hoc coalition might very well evolve in an advocacy 
coalition over time. Further research could consider employing the Advocacy Coalition 
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Framework by Sabatier (1998), to study the Coalition for Energy Savings if the cooperation 
remains intact. This is in line with Warleighs suggestions, namely to supervise a coalition 
after the conclusion of the legal proposal it was meant to advocate (2000: 240). This should 
be done in order to better determine if the choice of collaboration partners was due to issue 
specific causes or shared beliefs and follow up with studying the energy efficiency subsystem 
over time. The Advocacy Coalition Framework is said to offer a number of advantages in its 
application on EU policy processes, since coalitions that are composed of NGOs, businesses 
organization, research institutes or government officials can often be identified (Sabatier 
1998: 121). Also, the Advocacy Coalition Framework is frequently applied to environmental 
disputes (Szarka 2010: 838), and should thereby have relevance for the energy efficiency 
sector. This might prove to be fertile approach for a further study as informants perceived 








7.1 Academic and EC Literature  
Aberbach, Joel D. & Bert A. Rockman (2002). “Conducting and Coding Elite Interviews”,  
PS: Political Science and Politics, 35, 4, pp. 673-676. 
 
Andersen, Svein S. (2006). “Aktiv informantintervjuing”, Norsk Statsvitenskapelig Tidsskrift,  
22,3, pp. 278-298.  
 
Andersen, Svein S. and Eliassen Kjell. A. (1995). “EU lobbying: the new research agenda.”,   
European journal of political research, 27, 4, pp. 427 – 441.  
 
Austen-Smith, David (1993). “Information and Influence: Lobbying for Agendas and Votes”,  
 American Journal of Political Science, 37, 3, pp. 799 – 833.  
 
Baumgartner, Frank and Leech, Beth (1998). Basic interests: The importance of groups in   
politics and in political science. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
 
Bertoldi, Paolo, Rezess Silvia, Lees Eoin, Baudry Paul, Alexandre Jeandel og Labanca Nicola  
 (2010). “Energy supplier obligations and white certificate schemes: Comparative  
analysis of experiences in the European Union”, Energy Policy, 38, 3, pp. 1455 – 
1469. 
 
Bertoldi, Paolo and Huld, Thomas (2006). “Tradable certificates for renewable electricity and  
 energy savings”, Energy Policy, 34, 2, pp. 212 – 222. 
 
Bernhagen, Patrick (2007). The political power of business: structure and information in  
 public policymaking. London:  Routledge.  
 
Berry, Jeffrey M. (2002): “Validity and Reliability Issues in Elite Interviewing”, PS: Political  
 Science and Politics, 35, 4, 679-682.  
Beyers, Jan (2004). “Voice and Access: Political Practices of European Interest  
Associations”, European Union Politics, 5, 2, pp.211 – 240.  
 
Beyers, Jan and Bart Kerremans (2007). “Critical resource dependencies and the 
Europeanization of domestic interest groups”, Journal of European Public Policy, 14, 
3, pp. 460-481. 
 
Beyers, Jan, Rainer Eising and William Maloney (2008). “Researching Interest Group Politics  
in Europe and Elsewhere: Much We Study, Little We Know?”, West European 





Binderkrantz, Anne Skorkjær and Krøyer, Simon (2012). “Customizing Strategy: Policy  
Goals and interest groups strategies”, Interest Groups and Advocacy 1, 1, pp. 115 – 
138. 
 
Bouwen, Pieter (2002). “Corporate Lobbying in the European Union: The Logic of Access”,  
Journal of European Public Policy, 9, 3, pp. 365–390.  
 
Bouwen, Pieter (2004). “Exchanging access goods for access: A comparative study of   
business lobbying in the European Union institutions”, European Journal of Political  
Research, 43, 3, pp. 337–369.  
 
Bouwen, Pieter (2009). “The European Commission”, in David Coen and Jeremy Richardson  
(eds.): Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, Actors and Issues. Oxford: Oxford  
University Press, pp. 19 – 38.  
 
Bouwen, Pieter and Margaret McCown (2007). “Lobbying versus litigation: political and 
legal strategies of interest representation in the European Union”, Journal of European 
Public Policy, 14, 3, pp. 422-443. 
 
Broscheid, Andreas and David Coen (2003). “Insider and outsider lobbying of the European 
Commission: An informational model of forum politics." European Union Politics 
4,2, pp.165 – 189.  
 
Broscheid, Andreas and Coen, David (2007). “Lobbying activity and fora creation in the EU:   
empirically exploring the nature of the policy good”, Journal of European Public  
Policy, 14, 3, pp. 346–365. 
 
Bryman, Allan (2004). Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Burns, Tom R. and Carson, Marcus (2011). “European Union, neo-corporatist and pluralist  
governance arrangements: lobbying and policy-making patterns in a comparative  
perspective.” International Journal of Regulation and Governance, 2, 2 pp. 129 – 175.  
 
Carpenter, Daniel P., Esterling Kevin M. and Lazer David M.J. (2004). “Friends, brokers, and
 transitivity: who  informs whom in Washington politics?”, Journal of Politics, 66, 1,
 pp. 224 – 246.  
Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2007): “It’s the Process Stupid! Tracing Causal Mechanisms in European 
 and International Politics”, in Audie Klotz (ed.): Qualitative Methods in International
 Relations: A Pluralist Guide. New York: Palgrave Macmillan 
Chalmers, Adam, W. (2011). “Interests, Influence and Information: Comparing the Influence
 of Interest Groups in the European Union” Journal of European Integration, Volume
 33, 4, pp. 471 – 486. 
Chalmers, Adam W. (2013a). “Trading information for access: informational lobbying
 strategies and interest group access to the European Union” Journal of European




Chalmers, Adam W. (2013b).”With a lot of Help from their Friends: Explaining the Social
 Logic of Informational Lobbying in the European Union,” European Union Politics,
 0, 0, pp.  1 – 22.  
 
Coen, David (1997). “The evolution of the large firm as a political actor in the European 
Union”. Journal of Public Policy, 4, 1, pp. 91–108. 
 
Coen, David (2007). “Empirical and theoretical studies in EU lobbying”, Journal of European   
Public Policy, 14, 3, pp. 333 – 345. 
 
Coen, David and Jeremy Richardson (eds.) (2009). Lobbying the European Union: 
Institutions, Actors and Issues. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Crombez, Cristophe (2002).  Information, Lobbying and the Legislative Process in the 
European Union. European Union Politics, 3(1) pp. 7–32 
 
Duffield, John S. and Birchfield, Vicki L. (2011). “Introduction: The Recent Upheaval in EU
 Energy Policy” in Birchfield Vicki L. and Duffield John S. (eds.), Toward a Common
 European Union Energy Policy: Problems, Progress, and Prospects. Palgrave
 Macmillan, New York, pp. 1 – 9.  
 
Dür, Andreas (2008a). “Measuring Interest Group Influence in the EU – A Note on 
Methodology”, European Union Politics, 9, 4, pp. 559 – 574. 
 
Dür, Andreas (2008b). “Interest Groups in the European Union: How Powerful Are They?” 
West European Politics, 31,6, pp. 1212 – 30. 
 
Dür, Andreas and de Bièvre, Dirk (2007a). “Inclusion without Influence? NGOs in European
 Trade Policy”, Journal of Public Policy 27, 1, pp. 79 – 101. 
 
Eikeland, Per Ove (2008). “EU Internal Market Policy. New Dynamics in the Brussels Policy  
Game?” Report 14. Lysaker: Fridjof Nansen Institute. 
 
Eikeland, Per Ove (2011). “The Third Internal Energy Market Package: New Power Relations  
among Member States, EU Institutions and Non-state Actors?”, Journal of Common  
Market Studies, 49, 2, pp. 243–263.  
 
Eising, Rainer (2007a). ‘Interest Groups and the European Union,’ in Michelle Cini (ed.): 
European Union Politics. Second Edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
 
Eising, Rainer (2007b). “The access of business interests to EU institutions: towards èlite  
pluralism?” Journal of European Public Policy, 14, 3, pp. 384–403.  
 
Eising, R. (2007c) “Institutional context, organizational resources and strategic choices”, 
European Union Politics 8, 3, pp. 329 – 62. 
Eising, Rainer (2009). The Political Economy of State-Business Relations in Europe: Interest
 Mediation, Capitalism and EU Policy Making. London: Routledge.  
87 
 
European Commission (2005). Doing More with Less; Green Paper on Energy Efficiency.
 COM (2005) 265 June 22.  
European Commission (2006). Directive 2006/32/EC of the European Parliament and of the
 Council of 5 April 2006 on energy end-use efficiency and energy services and 
 repealing Council Directive 93/76/EEC 
 
European Commission (2007). Green Paper on Market-based Instruments for Environment
 and Related Policy Purposes, COM (2007) 140 and SEC (2007) 388 March 28 
 
European Commission (2008a). 20 20 by 2020. Europe’s climate change opportunity. COM
 2008) 30, January 23.  
 
European Commission (2008b). Second Strategic Energy Review: EU Energy Security and
 Solidarity Action Plan. MEMO (2008) 781 November 13.  
 
European Commission (2008c). Communication from the Commission. Energy efficiency:
 delivering the 20 % target. (COM 2008) 772 final. November 13.  
 
European Commission (2009). Synthesis of the complete assessment of all 27 National
 Energy Efficiency Action Plans as required by Directive 2006/32/EC on energy end
 use efficiency and energy services . SEC(2009) 889, June 23.   
 
European Commission (2010). Energy 2020.A strategy for competitive, sustainable and
 secure energy (COM 2010), 639 final. November 10.  
European Commission (2011a). Energy Efficiency Plan 2011. March 8. 
 
European Commission (2011b). A Roadmap for moving to a competitive low carbon
 economy in 2050 COM(2011) 112. March 8.  
 
European Commission (2011c). Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of
 the Council on energy efficiency and repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and
 2006/32/EC.SEC (2011) 779 and SEC (2011) 780. June 22.  
 
European Commission (2011d). Impact assessment: Accompanying the document Directive
 of the European Parliament and of the Council on energy efficiency and amending
 and subsequently repealing Directives 2004/8/EC and 2006/32/EC. COM (2011) 370
 and SEC (2011) 780. June 22.   
 
European Commission (2011e). Slides presentation "A new Directive on Energy Efficiency




European Commission ( 2012). Directive 2012/27/EU of the European Parliament and of the
 Council of 25 October  2012 on energy efficiency, amending Directives 2009/125/EC




Falkner, Gerda (2000). “Policy networks in a multi‐level system: Convergence towards
 moderate diversity?” West European Politics, 23, 4, pp. 94 – 120.  
 
George, Alexander L. and Andrew Bennett (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in  
the Social Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Gerring, John (2007). Case Study Research. Principles and Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge
 University Press. 
Greenwood, Justin (2011). Interest Representation in the European Union. New York:
 Palgrave Macmillian.  
Greenwood, Justin and Cram, Laura (1996). “European level Business Collective Action: The
 Study Agenda Ahead”, Journal of Common Market Studies, 34, 3, pp. 449 – 463.   
Gullberg, Anne Therese (2011). “Access to climate policy-making in the European Union and
 in Norway”, Environmental Politics, 20, 4,  pp. 464 – 484.    
Gullberg, Anne Therese (2008a). “Lobbying friends and foes in climate policy: The case of 
business and environmental interest groups in the European Union”, Energy Policy, 
36, 8, pp. 2964-2972. 
 
Gullberg, Anne Therese (2008b). “Rational Lobbying and EU climate policy”, International 
Environmental Agreements, 8, 2, pp. 161-178. 
 
Haas, Ernst B. (1958) [2004]. The uniting of Europe : political, social, and economic forces,  
1950-1957. Notre Dame, Ind. : University of Notre Dame Press. 
Heclo, Hugh. (1978). “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment”, in: A. King (ed.)
 The New American Political System. Washington: AEI. 
Henningsen, Jørgen (2011). “Energy Savings and Efficiency“ in Birchfield Vicki L. and 
Duffield John S. (eds.), Toward a Common European Union Energy Policy: 
Problems, Progress, and Prospects. Palgrave Macmillan, New York, pp. 130 –141.  
 
Hix, Simon and Høyland, Bjørn (2011). The Political System of the European Union. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
 
Holyoke Thomas T. (2009). “Interest group competition and coalition formation”, American
 Journal of Political Science, 53, 2, pp. 360 – 375. 
Hojnacki, Marie. (1997) “Interest Groups’ Decisions to Join Alliances or Work Alone”,
 American Journal of Political Science 41, 1, pp. 61 – 87. 
 
Hojnacki, Marie (1998). “Organized interests’ advocacy behavior in alliances”, Political
 Research Quarterly, 51, 2, pp. 437 – 459. 
 
Hojnacki, Marie, Kimball David C. Baumgartner, Frank R., Berry Jeffrey M., and  
Leech, Beth L. (2012). “Studying Organizational Advocacy and Influence: 
Reexamining Interest Group Research,” Annual Review of Political Science, 15, pp. 




Howlett, Michael, M. Ramesh, Anthony Perl (2009). Studying public policy. Policy  
cycles and policy subsystems. New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Hula, Kevin W. (1999). Lobbying Together: Interest Group Coalitions in Legislative Politics. 
Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
 
King, Gary, Keohane, Robert O. and Verba, Sidney (1994): Designing Social Inquiry.  
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Klüver, Heike (2013). Lobbying in the European Union: Interest groups, lobbying coalitions
 and policy change. Oxford: Oxford University Press 
 
Klüver, Heike (2012). “Informational lobbying in the European Union: The effects of  
organizational characteristics”. West European Politics, 35, 3, pp. 491–510. 
 
Klüver (2011a). “Lobbying in coalitions: Interest Group influence on European Union policy- 
Making” Nuffields working papers Series in Politics. Working paper.   
 
Klüver, Heike (2011b). “The contextual nature of lobbying: Explaining lobbying success in   
the European Union”. European Union Politics. 0,0, .pp.  1 – 24. 
 
Kohler-Koch, Beate (1997). “Organized Interests in the EC and the European Parliament”,
 European Integration online Papers 1,9.  
Knill, Cristoph (2001). “Private governance across multiple arenas: European interest
 associations as interface actors” Journal of European Public Policy 8, pp. 227 – 246.   
Lasswell, Harold (1936) [1950]. Politics: who gets what, when, how. New York:  Peter Smith. 
Leech, Beth L. (2002): “Asking Questions: Techniques for Semi-structured Interviews”, PS:  
Political Science and Politics 35: 4, 665-668.  
 
Levy, Jack S. (2008): “Case studies: Types, Designs, and Logics of Inference”, Conflict,  
Management and Peace Science 25, 1, pp. 1 – 18. 
 
Long, Tony and Lörinczi, Larisa (2009). “NGOs as Gatekeepers: A Green Vision”. In: Coen,
 David and Richardson, Jeremy (eds.) Lobbying the European Union: Institutions, 
 Actors and Issues. Oxford, Oxford University Press, pp. 168 – 188.  
 
Loomis, Burdett. A. (2002). “Interests, lobbying, and the U.S. congress. Past as prologue”. In
 Allan J. Cigler and Burdett. A. Loomis (eds.) Interest group politics. Washington,
 DC: CQ Press. 
 
Mahoney, Christine (2008). Brussels Versus the Beltway: Advocacy in the United 
States and the European Union. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press. 
 
Mahoney, Christine (2007a) ."Networking vs. Allying: The Decision of Interest Groups to
 Join Coalitions in the US and the EU", Journal of European Public Policy, 14, 2 pp.
 366 – 383.   
90 
 
Mahoney, Christine (2007b). “Lobbying Success in the United States and the European
 Union", Journal of Public Policy 27, 1, pp. 35 – 56. 
 
Majone, Giandomenico (1996). Regulating Europe. London: Routledge. 
McLaughlin, Andrew and Jordan, Grant (1993). “The rationality of lobbying in Europe: why
 are Euro-groups so numerous and so weak? Some evidence from the car industry”, in
 Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson (eds.) Lobbying in the European Community,
 Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Markussen, Peter and Svendsen, Gert Tingaard (2005). “Industry lobbying and the political
 economy of GHG trade in the European Union”, Energy Policy, 33, 2, pp. 245 – 255. 
Marsh, David (ed.) (1998). Comparing Policy Networks. Buckingham: Open University Pres.  
Michalowitz, Irina (2002). “Beyond Corporatism and Pluralism: Towards a New Theoretical
 Framework” In: Warleigh, Alex. and Fairbrass, Jenny, (eds.). Influence and Interests
 in the European Union: The New Politics of Persuasion and Advocacy. London,
 Europa Publications, pp. 35 – 53. 
Olson, Mancur (1971) [1965]. The Logic of Collective Action: Public Goods and the Theory
 of Groups. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 
Pijnenburg, Bert (1998). “EU Lobbying by ad hoc Coalitions: an Exploratory Case Study”,
 Journal of European Public Policy 14, 2, pp. 300 – 321.  
Pfeffer, and Salancik (1978). The external control of organization : a resource dependence
 perspective. New York: Harper and Row.  
Potters, Jan and van Winden, Frans (1992). “Lobbying and asymmetric information” .Public
 Choice, 74, pp. 269–292. 
Richardson, Jeremy (1996). European Union: power and policy-making. London: Routledge.  
Richardson, Jeremy (2000). “Government, interest groups and policy change”, Political
 Studies, 48, 5, pp. 1006 – 1025. 
Sabatier, Paul A. (1998) “The advocacy coalition framework: revisions and relevance for
 Europe”, Journal of European Public Policy, 5, 1, pp.  98 – 113. 
Sabatier, Paul. A. and Weible, Christopher. M. (2007). “The Advocacy Coalition Framework.
 Innovations and Clarifications”, in: Sabatier, Paul. A. (ed.), Theories of the Policy
 Process, Boulder: Westview press, pp. 189 – 223.  
Schleich, Joachim and Gruber, Edelgard (2008). “Beyond case studies: Barriers to energy
 efficiency in the commerce and service sectors”. Energy Economics, 30, 2, pp. 449
 – 464.  
Steuwer, Sibyl D. (2013).  Energy Efficiency Governance. The Case of White Certificate
 Instruments for Energy Efficiency in Europe, Wiesbaden: Springer VS.  
91 
 
Streeck, Wolfgang and Schmitter, Philippe C. (1991). “From corporatism to transnational
 pluralism: organized interests in the single European market”, Politics and Society 19,
 pp. 133 – 164. 
Svendsen, Gert Tingaard (1999). “U.S interest groups prefer emissions trading. A new
 perspective”. Public Choice, 101, pp. 109–128.  
Szarka, Joseph (2010). “Bringing interests back in: using coalition theories to explain
 European wind power policies”, Journal of European Public Policy, 17, 6, pp. 836
 – 853. 
Tansey, Oisín (2007). “Process Tracing and Elite Interviewing: A Case for Non-probability
 Sampling”, PS: Political Science and Politics, 40, 4, pp. 765 – 772. 
Toke, David (2008). “The EU Renewables Directive – What is the fuss about trading?”
 Energy Policy, 36, 8, pp. 3001-3008. 
van Schendelen, Rinus (2005). Machiavelli in Brussels. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University
 Press. 
 
Waide, Paul and Buchner, Barbara (2008). “Utility energy efficiency schemes: saving
 obligations and trading”, Energy Efficiency, 1, 4, pp. 297 – 311. 
 
Warleigh, Alex (2000). “The hustle: citizenship practice, NGOs and 'policy coalitions' in t
 European Union  - the cases of Auto Oil, drinking water and unit pricing”, Journal of
 European Public Policy, 7, 2, pp. 229 – 243.  
Wettestad, Jørgen (2009). “EU Energy-Intensive Industries and Emission Trading: Losers 
 Becoming Winners?” Environmental Policy and Governance, 19, 5, pp. 309 – 320. 
Wettestad, Jørgen (2011). “EU Emissions Trading: Achievements and Challenges” in
 Birchfield Vicki L. and Duffield John S. (eds.), Toward a Common European
 Union Energy Policy: Problems, Progress, and Prospects. Palgrave Macmillan, New
 York, pp. 87 – 113. 
Wettestad, Jørgen, Eikeland, Per Ove and Nilsson, Måns (2012) “EU Climate and Energy
 Policy: A Hesitant Supranational Turn?” Global Environmental Politics, 12, 2, pp. 65   
 – 84.  
Woll, Corneila (2006). “Lobbying in the European Union: From sui generis to a comparative 
 perspective”, Journal of European Public Policy, 13, 3, pp. 456 – 469. 
Wonka, Arndt, Baumgartner, Frank.R., Mahoney, Christine and Berkhout, Joost (2010).
 “Measuring the size of the EU interest group population’, European Union Politics,
 11, 3, pp. 463–476. 
Ydersbond, Inga M. (2011). Multi-level lobbying in the EU The case of the Renewables
 Directive and the German energy industry. Master Thesis. Oslo: Department of




Yin, Robert K. (2009). Case Study Research. Design and Methods. Fourth Edition. Los
 Angeles: Sage 
7.2 Web Sources and Position Papers 
BEE (2013). BEE – Dachverband der Erneubaren. Reading date 7.6.2013 
http://www.bee-ev.de/BEE/BEE.php  
 
BPIE (2010) Europe’s Buildings under the Microscope. Reading date 15.05.2013 
http://www.europeanclimate.org/documents/LR_%20CbC_study.pdf  
  




Businesseurope (2011). Businesseurope`s comments on the proposal for a Directive on 
Energy Efficiency (COM 2011) (370). Position paper.  
Coalition for Energy Savings (2011a). The Coalition Portfolio: Financial Issues for Energy
 Efficiency Position Paper.   
 
Coalition for Energy Savings (2011b). “Stefan Scheuer appointed”. Reading date 06.06.2013.  
http://energycoalition.eu/node/112  
 
Coalition for Energy Savings (2013). “Organisation”. Retrived 07.06.2013.  
http://energycoalition.eu/description   
 
COGEN Europe (2011). Position Paper on the Energy Efficiency Directive. Reading date




Coolproducts (2013). “Coolproducts” Reading day 9.06.2013.  
http://www.coolproducts.eu/about  
 
European Commission (2012). Public consultation . Financial support for Energy Efficiency




Economist Intelligence Unit ( 2012).” Energy efficiency and energy savings. A view from th




Ecofys (2010). Energy Savings 2020 – How to triple the impact of energy saving policies in













EED guidebook (2013c). “Energy efficiency obligation schemes & alternatives”. Reading
 date” Reading date 04.06.2013  
http://www.eedguidebook.eu/alternatives.html 
 
Eichhammer, W., T. Fleiter, B. Schlomann, S. Faberi, M. Fioretto, N. Piccioni, S.
 Lechtenböhmer, A. Schüring, G. Resch (2009). Study on the Energy Savings




EPE (2010). Cool Products, Warm Homes a European Manifesto for Sustainable Heating and
 Cooling of Buildings. Reading date 08.06.2013  
http://www.epe.be/files/WWF.pdf 
 
Euractiv (2010).  Press message: Business and NGOs Unite to Urge Energy Ministers to








Euractiv (2013a) “19 EU states face court action over buildings' CO2 emissions”. Reading









Eurelectric (2011). EURELECTRIC views on the Proposal for a Directive on Energy











Eurima (2011b) Position Paper. Proposal for a Directive on Energy Efficiency  
http://www.eurima.org/uploads/ModuleXtender/Publications/81/Eurima_Position_Pap
er_EED_18_10_2011_FINAL.pdf  
EuroACE (2009). Working Paper Financial and Fiscal Instruments for Energy Efficiency in
 Buildings.  
 
EuroACE (2010). Klinckenberg Consultants for EuroACE. “Making Money Work for
 Buildings: Financial and Fiscal  instruments for Energy Efficiency in Buildings.” 2010 
 
EuroACE (2011) EuroACE Position on the Proposed Directive of the European Parliament
 and Council on Energy Efficiency (COM(2011) 370 final. Position paper. Reading
 date 07.06.2013 
http://www.euroace.org/MediaPublications/PositionPapers.aspx  
EuroACE (2013). Partnership. Reading date 07.06.2013 
http://www.euroace.org/AboutUs/Partnerships.aspx  
 
IEA (2010). “Energy Efficiency Governance”. Reading date 15.04.2013 
http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/eeg.pdf  
 
IEA (2012). “World Energy Outlook”. Reading date 01.05.2013 
http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/energy/world-energy-outlook_20725302 
 
IEA (2013). “FAQs: Energy Efficiency”.  
http://www.iea.org/aboutus/faqs/energyefficiency/  
KfW (2013). “Ermittlung der Wachstumswirkungen der KfW-Programme zum





Orgalime (2011.Commission proposal for an Energy Efficiency Directive COM (2011) 370




Renovate Europe (2013). “Renovate Europe Campaign”.  Reading date 08.06.2013. 
http://www.renovate-europe.eu/renovate-europe-campaign 
 







List of informants 
Businesseurope, Mr. Alexandre Affre, Senior Advisor, Industrial Affairs.  
CAN-Europe, Ms. Erica Hope, NGO Coordinator, now in ECF. 
Coalition for Energy Savings, Mr. Stefan Scheuer, Secretary General.  
Eurelectric, Ms. Jesse Scott, Head of Unit, Environment and Sustainable Development Policy. 
Eurima, Mr. Andoni Hidalgo, Public Affairs and Communications Manager. 
EuroACE, Mr. Adrian Joyce, Secretary General and Renovate Europe Campaign Director.  
FIEC, Mr. Frank Faraday, Director of Technical Affairs (resigned 10
th
 of June).  
Mr. Matthieu Ballu, former employee in the secretariat of Coalition for Energy Savings, now 
DG Mare.  
Orgalime, Ms. Anne-Claire Rasselet, Advisor in Environment Team.   






















Name         Organization   
    
Interview Opening 
 Thank for setting aside time to conduct the interview. 
 Ask if OK to be cited in name in the final study.  
 Start with some grand tour questions, general activity in the interest group, how is a 
day at the office. 
 Ask the representative what it is their impression of the EED policy process.  
 
1. Questions about the general stance of the interest group.   
The Interest group stance on binding 
energy efficiency targets.   
 
 
Would you prefer a stricter 
regulatory framework than the 
directive outcome?  
 
(Also in terms of technical details; 
primary final energy, audits, 
measurement) 
 
Interest group view of the introduced 
Energy Efficiency Obligations as an 




Who, in your opinion, should bear 
the cost of undertaking energy 
audits?  
 
Potential consequences of the 





2. Mapping the access to the Commission before the proposal in June 2011.  
Degree 1 2 3 4 5 
What type of contact did the 
[interest group] have with the 
Commission? 
 
(Face-to-face meetings, email 
correspondence, phone calls, 
write letters, et.c.) 
 
How difficult was it for the 
[interest group] to get 
Commission access?  
(1,easy – 5 hardest) 
     
To what level did the [interest 
group] get access? 
Commissioner (1), 
commission cabinet, senior 
official, policy officer, desk 
officer (5). 
Probe: level importance.  
     
98 
 
How often did they discuss 
policy with the Commission 
in average? (Probe on 
intensity) 
(1,Seldom, once a month, 
twice month, weekly basis, 5 
two times a week or more)  
     
Did the Commission actively 
request any type of 
information from [interest 
group]?  
(1 didn’t occur – 5 
Commission sought info.)  
     
Can the [interest group] name 
one or more Commission 
officials with whom they had 
contact with during the 
proposal stage? 
 (Name, email).  
 
Was it a difference in access 
for the [interest group] before 
and after the Energy Action 




3. Demand side questions for Commission and interest group.  
What kind of expert 
information did the 
Commission need from the 
[interest group]? 







What type of political salient 
information was the 
Commission in need of? 
(general opinion about the 
European interest or different 
member states positions) 
 
What kind of these 
information types was most 
important to the 
Commission? 
 
Expert knowledge or 
European salient information.  
 
Was it more salient to 
provide relevant information 
before or after the Energy 
Efficiency action plan in 
March 2011?  
 
Degree 1 2 3 4 5 
Did the Commission rely on 
information from the [interest 
group] over a protracted 
amount of time? 
(1 to 5, little to high degree of 
dependency) 
     
To which degree does the 
[interest group] perceive 
themselves to be the sole 
provider of their information 
resources? 
(1, little degree- 5, high)  








4. Interest groups ability to supply information.  
Did the [interest group] undertake 
in-house technical research with the 
aim to supply the Commission with 
information? 
 
Did the [interest group] request 
technical analysis from their member 
organizations in order to supply the 
Commission with relevant analysis? 
 
Could the [interest group] please 
describe their general activities of 
analysis within the field of Energy 
Efficiency? 
 
(Probe Internal capacity for 
conducting research, staff and 
resources) 
 
Was the interest group ever 
contacted directly by the 
Commission for policy relevant 
information?  
 
If yes on the above questions: please answer the following two questions.  
Degree 1 2 3 4 5 
How fast could the [interest 
group] react to the 
Commission’s request?  
(Response time: day after, 
following week, next week, 
same month, later).  
     
Did the [interest group] 
supply information to the 
Commission more frequently, 
rather than one-off basis?  





5. Types of involvement during the Directive run-up phase 
Degree 1 2 3 4 5 
Did the [interest group] 
coordinate their activities 
with other interest groups to 
influence the EED?   
(1, no coordination – 5, high 
degree) 
     
Did the interest group have 
much contact with other 
interest organizations to 
produce policy relevant 
information? 
(1,low degree – 5, high 
degree).  
     
What approach did the 
[interest group] apply to 
achieve access to the 
Commission  
 
(face-to-face meetings, phone 
calls, email correspondence, 
launch events, participate in 
campaigns).  
 
Did the [interest group] attach 
importance to be a part of a 
network during the run-up 
phase of the proposal?   
(yes/no – participate in a 
group which shared view) 
 
Did the [interest group] have 
a constant position on the 
EED? 
(Change after Commission 






6. Those involved in the Coalition for Energy Savings. 
Degree 1 2 3 4 5 
Regulation of membership: 
how is it regulated? 
 
 (1, little openness – 5, high) 
     
Please explain how was the 
Coalition for Energy Savings 
formed? 
Describe the start up-phase. 
How was position aggregated?  
 
(Who was first 
mover/initiator/leader?)  
 
Fragmented or concentration 
of power in the network?  
 
Driver behind network: energy 
efficiency targets, policy 
instruments, financing?  
What policy instrument did 
they promote? 
 
Motivation: interest or ideas? 
 
Please describe interaction: 
before EED proposal.  
 
Did some interests dominate? 
bargaining/conflict/cooperation 
 
Explain their role and how 
long worked in the coalition/ 
how was coordinating 






 Ask the persons if he or she has any questions and provide responses 
 Ask if they would like to add something 
 Thank the representative for his or her participation.  
 
 
 
 
